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NOTES
RIGHT TO RECEIVE LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
WHERE BENEFICIARY PREDECEASES INSURED*
Most modern life insurance policies contain clauses reserving in the insured
power to change the beneficiary and "vesting" the proceeds in the insured should
the beneficiary predecease him.' It has generally been held under these clauses
that the beneficiary's representatives take no interest in the proceeds of the
policy in the event of his dying before the insured.
2
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia last year chose to dis-
regard this body of precedent. In Kindleberger v. Lincoln National Bank of
Washingtona the insured carried two policies naming his wife beneficiary and
containing both revesting and change of beneficiary clauses.4 His wife died in
1935 and the insured died eight years later without having changed the benefi-
ciary." By a divided decision the beneficiary's administrator recovered the pro-
ceeds over the claims of the insured's executor.6 Thus the majority of the court
refused to give effect to the express revesting provision of the policy.
* Kindleberger v. Lincoln National Bank of Washington, 155 F.2d 281 (App. D.C.
1946), rehearing denied, Sept. 5, 1946, cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 495 (1947).
1. See CARNAHAN, CoNFLicr OF LAWS AND LiFE INSURANCE CoNnAcrs §§ 26, 74
(1942); Cohen, The Role of Life Insurance as an Asset in Bankruptcy, 28 VA. L. REV.
211, 224 (1941) ; Brief of the Life Insurance Ass'n of America and the National Associa-
tion of Life Underwriters as Ainicus Curiae (in support of petition for certiorari), pp.
20-1, Kindleberger v. Lincoln National Bank of Washington, 67 Sup. Ct. 495 (1947). All
specimen forms, for instance, in the North Dakota Code contain both clauses. N. D. Rzv.
CODE §§ 26.0326-31 (1943). The clauses quoted in note 4 infra are typical.
2. See 2 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§901, 1121-8 (1941); 7
COOLEY, BRarYs ON INSURANCE 6345-6, 6403-7 (2d ed. 1928) ; CARNAHAN, 10. Cit. sufra
note 1; VANCE, IN SURANCE 544-5 (1930) ; material in notes 19 and 29 in!fra.
3. 155 F.2d 281 (App. D.C. 1946).
4. "The Insured may from time to time change the beneficiary, provided this Policy
is not then assigned. .. . In the event of the death of any beneficiary before the Insured
the interest of such beneficiary shall vest in the Insured, unless otherwise provided herein."
Brief for Appellant, Joint Appendix, p. 7, Kindleberger v. Lincoln Nat. Bank, 155 F.2d
281 (App. D.C. 1946).
5. In 1937 the insured assigned the larger of the two policies to the Perpetual Build-
ing Association of Washington, D.C. as security for a loan which was paid off in full be-
fore the insured's death. Id. at 8. Such an assignment was considered essentially a change
of beneficiary, and the assignee was in fact entered in the change of beneficiary column on
the policy. On payment no new entry was made. Ibid.
6. The insurer (New York Life Insurance Company), faced with the claims of both
parties, had paid the proceeds to the insured's executors with the agreement that the money
would be held in trust to await a judicial declaration as to whom it belonged. The benefi-
ciary's administrator brought suit to obtain this determination. The District Court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered judgment
entered for the plaintiff. Kindleberger v. Lincoln National Bank, 155 F.2d 281, 282 (App.
D.C. 1946).
NOTES
The court based its opinion primarily on a standard type statute which pro-
vides that the:
"... beneficiary or assignee . . . [of a life insurance policy] . . .
other than the insured or the person effecting such insurance, or his
executors or administrators, shall be entitled to its proceeds and avail
[sic] against the creditors and representatives of the insured . . .
whether or not the right to change the beneficiary is reserved or per-
mitted and whether or not the policy is made payable to the person
whose life is insured, if the beneficiary or assignee shall predecease
such person . . .-7
The phrase "or his executors or administrators," according to the majority of
the court, referred to the "beneficiary or assignee" rather then to "the in-
sured." s The dissenting judge observed that the expression 'lawful benefi-
ciary, other than the insured, his executor or administrators," seems to be a
common one in the insurance field, and concluded that the antecedent for "his"
was "insured."-9
At best, this section of the District of Columbia Code is clumsily worded.
The dissent's interpretation, however, would seem in accord with the manifest
purpose of the section in the light of its legislative history. Adopted in
1934,10 it was taken verbatim from a New York law passed in 1927n as a
creditor's exemption statute designed to immunize the cash surrender value or
proceeds from claims of the insured's creditors during the beneficiary's life-
time despite reservation of control by the insured through the change of bene-
ficiary clause and retention of a contingent interest by the revesting clause.
2 -
7. 48 S"AT. 1175 (1934), D.C. CoDE §35-716 (1940).
8. Kindleberger v. Lincoln Nat. Bank of Washington, 155 F2d 281, 283 (App. D.C.
1946).
9. Id. at 288-9.
10. 48 STAT. 1175 (1934), D.C. CoDE § 35-716 (1940). This section was part of a
comprehensive statute passed to regulate the life insurance business in the District of Co-
lumbia. See SE-,. REP. No. 1420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). Agitation for such regula-
tion had started some years before. See Hearng before Subcommittee on Irnsurance
and Banking of the Committee on the District of Columbia on H.R. 3941, 71st Cong., 2nd
Sess. 26-7 (1930).
11. N.Y. Laws 1927, c. 468, § 1; Ixs. LAw § 55-a (Cahill's ed. 1930).
12. As the change of beneficiary and revesting clauses came to be more and more
common in insurance policies the question arose whether such interest as the insured re-
tained was available to his trustee in bankruptcy. In Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U.S. 50
(1917), the Supreme Court held that where the insured reserved an absolute power to
change beneficiaries the cash surrender value of the policy was an asset of the estate within
the meaning of § 70a of the Bankruptcy Act. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110
(1940). The New York Life Underwriters' Association in cooperation with the Associa-
tion of Life Insurance Presidents succeeded in getting this section of the Insurance Law
passed so as to place the proceeds and avails of an insurance policy out of the reach of
the insured's creditors, even though the policy itself contained revesting and change of
beneficiary clauses. Thus the proceeds now come within § 6 of the Bankruptcy Act as a
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Nothing surrounding the passage of the Act indicated that when the benefi-
ciary died first the proceeds were intended to pass to his representatives 1 8
Nor have the New York courts so construed it either before or after the en-
actment of the District of Columbia counterpart. 14
To implement its construction of the statute, the majority relied on a series
of early Kentucky decisions interpreting a somewhat similar statute.1 None
state-permitted exemption. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 24 (1940). See generally,
Hirst, History of the New York Life Inmrance Law of 1927, 4 Am. BANsK. Rv. 328
(1928) ; Strouse and Blum, Rights of Creditors and Beneficiaries in Life Insuranec Policies
in New York, 4 Am. BAN.. REV. 227 (1928) ; Cohen, Execution Process and Life Insur-
ance, 39 CoL L. Ray. 139, 146-54 (1939); Weaver, Protection of Life Insurance Policy
Proceeds from Creditor's Claims, 6 Assoc. oF Liz INS. COUNSEL Paoc. 1934-6 148, 164-8
(1934) ; Pierson, Recent Legislation, Preserving Insirance Proceeds for Bencfieiaries, 16
A. B. A. J. 23-6 (1930). This purpose and effect of the statute was specifically affirmed
at its first appearance before the courts. In re Messenger, 29 F.2d 158 (C. C. A. 2d 1928).
Insurance company sponsorship was presumably based on the probability that the
statute would increase the desirability and consequently the sales of life insurance policies.
13. All discussion of the act has focused on the relation between the creditors of the
insured and the proceeds of the policy in the hands of a beneficiary other than the insured;
none of the authorities cited in note 12 supra even suggests that the exemption extends in
favor of the representative of a beneficiary who dies before the insured.
It was the careless grammatical draftsmanship, apparently, which produced the con-
fusion in the principal case: the inopportune insertion of the comma preceding the phrase
"or his executors or administrators" caused the majority of the court to refer the posses-
sive adjective "his" back to "beneficiary" rather than to "insured." The comma following
the words "whose life is insured" in the last sentence is also unhappily placed: gram-
matically, though unrealistically, it could be said to make the clause beginning "if the bene-
ficiary" apply to the entire section and not just to the "whether" clause. While this con-
struction would underline the result reached by the majority the court did not seize upon it,
Had both these commas been omitted it is hard to imagine how the majority could
possibly have come to the same conclusion. See notes 21 and 22 infra.
14. In re Czarniak's Estate, 140 Misc. 754, 251 N. Y. Supp. 536 (Surr. Ct. 1931) (pro-
ceeds of policy containing both revesting and change of beneficiary clause passed under will
of insured where beneficiary died first). In Mattern v. Gas Co. Employees' Mut, Aid Soc.
of N. Y., 141 Misc. 510, 253 N. Y. Supp. 124, 126 (N. Y. City Cts. 1931) a predeceased
beneficiary's executors were allowed to recover the proceeds, but only because the by-laws
of the fraternal insurance society so provided. Moreover, in a series of actions arising out
of a "common disaster" where insured and beneficiary died in the same accident, the N. Y.
courts have held that where the policy contains both clauses, the proceeds revert to the
estate of the insured in the absence of clear proof of survival by the beneficiary. Morgan v.
Sackett, 172 Misc. 855, 16 N. Y. S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1939); It re Burza's Estate, 155
Misc. 44, 279 N. Y. Supp. 90 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ; In re Valverde's Estate, 148 Misc. 49, 347,
265 N. Y. Supp. 484 (Surr. Ct. 1933), aff'd -without opinion, 242 App. Div. 653, 273 N.'Y.
Supp. 371 (2d Dep't 1934).
15. "When a policy of insurance is effected by any person on his own life or on an-
other life in favor of some person other than himself, having an insurable interest therein,
the lawful beneficiary thereof, other than himself or his legal representatives, shall be
entitled to its proceeds against the creditors and representatives of the person effecting the
same," Ky. Acts 1893, c. 171, § 118. CARROLL'S Ky. STAT. § 655 (Baldwin's ed. 1936).
The leading case of Hall v. Ayer's Guardian, 32 Ky. L. 288, 105 S. W. 911 (1907)
gave the proceeds of the policy to a predeceased beneficiary's daughter (granddaughter of
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of the insurance policies involved in the Kentucky cases, however, contained
a modem revesting clause. Furthermore, as early as 1916 the Kentucky legis-
lature indicated possible dissatisfaction with this line of decisions by including
in a statute regulating fraternal benefit societies a provision that "no benefi-
ciary shall have or obtain any vested interest in the said benefit until the same
has become due and payable upon the death of the said member [insured]."10
During the last fifteen years, in cases involving policies with modern revesting
clauses, moreover, the Kentucky Supreme Court has impliedly distinguished
the earlier cases and uniformly followed the prevailing view. 1L7
Most states have either appropriated the New York statute verbatim or, like
Kentucky, have adopted one similar to the New York statute except for the
omission of that portion reading ". . . whether or not the right to change the
beneficiary is reserved or permitted and whether or not the policy is made
payable to the person whose life is insured, if the beneficiary or assignee shall
predecease such person [i.e. the insured]. . . ."18 In none of these states
insured) rather than to insured's estate. The court was influenced, however, by a clause
in the policy which stated that if the named beneficiaries were not living at the time of
insured's death the proceeds should go to the "legal representatives" of the insured. The
court construed "legal representatives" to mean heirs and distributees-thereby including
the insured's granddaughter-rather than emecutors and administrators (in which case the
proceeds would eventually have gone to the insured's second wife). Id. at 291, 105 S. IV.
at 913. Only by implication did the court decide that the phrase referred to the bene-
ficiary rather than insured. Ibid., 105 S. V. at 914. On the authority of the Hall decision,
the Kentucky courts, in a series of subsequent cases, construed the statute to give bene-
ficiaries' representatives rights superior to those of the insured's estate. Neal's Adn'rs v.
Shirley's Adm'rs, 137 Ky. 818, 127 S. NV. 471 (1910) ; Bucdler v. Supreme Council of
Catholic Knights, 143 Ky. 618, 136 S. XV. 1006 (1911) ; O'Bryan v. England, 173 Ky. 12,
19, 189 S. NV. 1126 (1916) ("in the absence of any authority given by the policy") ; Bright
v. Supreme Council of Catholic Knights, 183 Ky. 388, 209 S. IV. 379 (1919); Conn v.
White, 189 Ky. 185, 224 S. XV. 764 (1923).
16. Ky. Acts 1916, c. 27, § 6 CnARoLL's Ky. STAT. § 631c-6 (Baldwin's ed. 1936).
17. Colovos Adm'rs v. Gouvas, 269.Ky. 752, 10 S. IV. 2d 820 (1937) (common dis-
aster case; since, under Kentucky law, there is no presumption of survivorship, the pro-
ceeds revert to the insured's estate where the policy contains an automatic revesting clause).
Hunt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 243 Ky. 511, 49 S. ,V.2d 323 (1932) ; Hamblin's Adm'x v.
Hambli's Adm'r, 241 Ky. 447, 44 S. V.2d 249 (1931) (The court stated that to give the
proceeds to the beneficiary's estate would be to ignore the specific provisions of the re-
vesting clause). See also McKenty v. Caldwell, 287 Ky. 750, 155 S. NV.2d 193 (1941)
(representatives of one of the beneficiaries who predeceased insured could claim no inter-
est in a policy -which provided payment to survi ng beneficiaries).
18. It was the addition of this clause, which the majority of the court thought signifi-
cant in distinguishing the result of the Colovos case, cited note 17 suPra, from the instant
situation. "It is the absence from the Kentucky statute of the language just quoted which
has led the Court of Appeals of Kentucky to hold, in the Colovos and earlier cases, that the
statute of that state does not apply if the right to change the beneficiary is reserved and if
the policy is made payable to the insured in the event of the prior death of the beneficiary.
The presence of the quoted provision in the statute here under consideration clearly over-
rules stipulations to the contrary which may be contained in policies." 155 F2d 281, 284
(App. D. C. 1946). Yet the addition of this phrase was simply to emphasize the fact that
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have the courts interpreted either type of statute to override the revesting pro-
vision of the policy by granting the proceeds to a predeceased beneficiary's
representatives.19 Statutes in some states, framed in terms of function, permit
little doubt as to their construction.2 0 Still other states have used the New
even though the insured has almost complete control over the policy by virtue of these
clauses the proceeds still were not available to his creditors. See authorities cited note 12
supra. Following the enactment of Section 55a in New York, twelve other jurisdictions
enacted statutes also containing this clause. See Weaver, supra note 12, at 152. See gen-
erally on creditors' exemption statutes, 2 APPLEMAN, Op. Cit. supra note 2, § 1342; COOLEY,
op. cit. srupra note 2, at 6508-17; JoYcE, INsuRA cE § 879 (2d ed. 1917) ; VANCE, INSUn-
ANCE § 162 n.34-6 (1930).
19. The overwhelming weight of authority revests the proceeds in the insured in ac-
cordance with the terms of the policy. Merritt v. Scruggs, 172 Tenn. 368, 112 S. W.2d 825
(1938) ; cf. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 15 F. Supp. 777 (D. Mass. 1936) ;
Parker v. Potter, 200 N. C. 348, 157 S. E. 68 (1931) ; cases collected in 2 APPLEMAN,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 122 n.9-17 and in VANcE, INSURAxCE. § 149 n.36 (1930).
Under "old line policies," which included neither clause, the beneficiary was said to
take a vested interest in the proceeds transferable to his estate should he predecease
insured. When the power to change is reserved to the insured, on the other hand, the bene-
ficiary's interest has been thought too remote to be transferable to his representatives and
bas been described by courts as "contingent," Morgan v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 F.2d
129, 130 (C. C. A. 8th 1938) ; "a mere expectancy," Nance v. Hilliard, 101 F.2d 957, 958
(C. C. A. 8th 1939) ; a class gift conditioned on survival, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Devine,
180 Ill. App. 422, 430 (1913) ; and even a vested right in the nature of an ex:pectancy,
Viles v. Prudential Ins. Co., 124 F.2d 78, 81 (C. C. A. 10th 1941). Similarly, the proceeds
of a policy have been likened to a "resulting trust" and a "lapsed legacy" when the bene-
ficiary dies during life of the insured. See Haskins v. Kendall, 158 Mass. 224, 227, 33 N. E,
495, 497 (1893) (resulting trust); Washington Ben. End. Assoc. v. Wood, 4 MacKay
19, 27-8 (App. D. C. 1885) (lapse of legacy) ; Kruger v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 298 Mass. 124, 129, 10 N. E.2d 97, 100 (1937) (lapsed trust). For a history and
criticism of this indiscriminate appropriation of concepts from property law to insurance
contracts see Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a Life Insurance Policy, 31 YALE L. J.
343 (1922); VANCE, INSURANCE §§ 144-8 (1930); CARNAnAN, op. Cit. supra note 1, § 60;
Grismore, The Assignment of a Life Insurance Policy, 42 Micu. L. RIv. 789, 798-9
(1944) ; Note 28 YALE L. J. 89 (1918).
Where insured and beneficiary both perish in a common disaster the rule of the New
York courts is generally followed (upra note 14), and the proceeds revert to the insured's
estate. McKinney v. Depoy, 213 Ind. 361, 12 N. E.2d 250 (1938) ; Fleming v. Grimes, 142
Miss. 522, 107 So. 420 (1926) ; Watkins v. Home Life and Accident Ins. Co., 137 Ark.
207, 208 S. W. 587 (1919) ; Note 113 A. L. R. 881 (1938). Cf. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Fink 118 F.2d 761 (C. C. A. 6th 1941) (wife-beneficiary died 22 hours after
insured; her right to receive unpaid share of the proceeds held to terminate on her death;
contingent beneficiary rather than her heirs entitled to remainder.
20. "All moneys, avails, cash values, and all and every benefit accruing under any
annuity contract or under any policy or certificate of life insurance payable to a bene-
ficiary other than the estate of the insured, and under any accident or health insurance
policy, heretofore or hereafter issued, shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or
other legal or equitable process, and from all claims of creditors of the insured, and of the
beneficiary if related to the insured by blood or marriage, in the absence of a written
agreement or assignment to the contrary." NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 44-371 (1943). "iT]he
proceeds ...shall be exempt from all liability for any debt of the person effecting the in.
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York prototype, but have resolved the ambiguity by eliminating a crucial
commas' or inserting a pair of well-placed parentheses.- Two states have
explicitly provided that in the event of a beneficiary's prior death, the pro-
ceeds shall be made payable to the insured or his estate.P
The majority in the principal case also leaned on two other sections of the
District of Columbia Code to support its construction of the main statute.
These sections provide that a policy effected in favor of a wife, children, rela-
tives, or a named creditor shall "vest" in them free of any claims of the in-
sured's general creditors,2 4 and that if a wife-beneficiary predeceases her
husband the proceeds may be made payable to her children, descendants, or
legal representatives.n These sections of the Code were borrowed from the
laws of Maryland 0 and adopted as part of the original District Code in
surance!" VAsH. REV. STAT. §§ 7230-1 (Remington, 1931). "The proceeds of a life insur-
ance policy, including cash surrender and loan values to an amount not exceeding ten thou-
sand dollars upon any one life, shall inure to the party or parties named as the beneficiaries
thereof, free from all liability for the debts of the person whose life was insured, even
though such person paid the premiums thereon." MIss. CODE Am;. § 303 (Rice and
Ethridge, 1942). "The surrender value of any policy ... which, upon the death of the in-
sured, would be payable to the wife or children... shall be exempt absolutely from the
claims of creditors of the insured." N. D. REv. Con § 26-1017 (1943). Section 55-a of the
New York Insurance Law was itself superseded in 1939 by a provision which avoids the
ambiguity of its predecessor: '.. . such third person beneficiary, assignee or payee shall
be entitled to the proceeds and avails of such policy as against the creditors, personal repre-
sentatives, trustees in bankruptcy and receivers in state and federal courts of the person
effecting the insurance." N.Y. Izes. LAw § 166 (MeKinney, 1940).
21. ". . . the lawful beneficiary thereof, other than the person effecting the insare
or his legal representatives, shall be entitled to its proceeds against the creditors and repre-
sentatives of the person effecting the same." (italics supplied) Ky. REv. STr. A:;.
§ 297.150 (Baldwin's ed. 1943).
22. ". . . the lawful beneficiary or assignee thereof (other than the insured or the
person so effecting such insurance, or his executors or administrators) shall be entitled to
the proceeds. . . ." Mic. STAT. ANN. § 24.287 (Moore, 1943).
23. K.A. GN. STAT. A-NN. §§ 40-415 (Corrick, 1935) ; OHio Gart. Cooz Am;. § 9399
(Page, 1939). Compare Mum. STAT. ANN. § 3323 (Mason, 1927) and Mo. REv. ST. T.
ANN. §§ 5848, 5850 (1942). Thirty-nine states have statutes providing that in fraternal
benefit association policies, no beneficiary takes a vested interest in a certificate until the
death of the insured member. See the Kentucky statute quoted supra, p. 857. See also
CARNAHAx, op. cit. supra note 1, § 74 n.161.
24. "All policies of life insurance upon the life of any person maturing on or after
January 1, 1902, and which have been or shall be taken out for the benefit of or bona-fide
assigned to the wife or children or any relative dependent upon such person, or any cred-
itor, shall be vested in such wife or children or other relative or creditor, free and clear
from all claims of the creditors of such insured person." 31 STAT. 1375 (1901), D. C. CoDE
§ 30-213 (1940).
25. "If the wife shall die before her husband, the amount of such insurance may be
payable after her death to the children or descendants for their use, and to their guardians
if under age; and if there be no children or descendants of the wife living at the time of
her death, to her legal representatives." Id. at § 30-214.
26. ANN. CODE OF MNID. Art. 45, §§ 9-10 (Flack, 1939). Section 9 was originally
adopted in 1878 and Section 10 in 1840. Laws 1878, ch. 290; Laws 1840, cl. 212.
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1901,27 a time when neither the change of beneficiary nor the revesting clause
was commonly included in an insurance policy. Similar statutes were passed
by most states in the nineteenth century to remove the disabilities of coverture
and to provide adequately for the wife and children of an insolvent insured, 8
It has never before been thought that they would have the effect of placing
the proceeds in the representatives of a wife-beneficiary when the policy itself
contained a clause stipulating otherwise.29
The Maryland statute in a series of early cases was constructed to place the proceeds
in the wife's representatives on her predecease even though there was no specific direction
in the policy itself. Thomas v. Cochran, 89 Md. 390, 43 Atl. 792 (1899) (proceeds were
asset of wife's estate which, upon her predecease, could be divested only by changing the
beneficiary) ; Expressman's Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Hurlock, 91 Md. 585, 46 Atd. 957 (1900) ;
Preston v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 95 Md. 101, 51 At!. 838 (1902). But in Pratt v. Hill,
124 Md. 252, 92 At. 543 (1914) the court said, by way of dictum, at 255, 92 Atd. at 544,
that in spite of § 10, if the policy provides otherwise the proceeds will not go to the legal
representatives of the wife. See also Rosman v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 127 Md. 689, 692-3, 96
At. 875, 876 (1916) (when rights of beneficiary are dependent on will of the assured,
beneficiary acquires no vested right until death of the insured).
27. See statement of Judge Walter S. Cox, in charge of preparing the code, in H. R.
Ra,. No. 1017, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1900). See also H. R. REP. No. 691, 56th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1900).
28. Statutes collected, CARNAHAN, op. cit. stpra note 1, § 60n. 10. See generally ibid.;
Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a Life Insurance Policy, 31 YALE L. J. 349-53 (1922) ;
Weaver, sapra note 12, at 164-6; Cohen, supra note 12, at 140, 170. North Carolina has
included such a provision in its constitution. N. C. CoNsT. ART. X, § 7. In time the scope
of statutes exempting proceeds of life insurance policies from claims of creditors was
broadened to include not only the wife and children but also any beneficiary whatsoever,
save the insured's estate. See note 12 supra. The legislatures unfortunately allowed the
older statutes to remain on the books, a fact which has caused some confusion. New York,
for instance, in Section 52 of the Domestic Relations Law exempted insurance purchased
with premiums less than $500 in favor of a wife-beneficiary. Doms. Rt. LAW § 52 (Cahill,
1930). Section 55-a of the Insurance Law was enacted without repealing this married
women's statute. This put the wife in a less favored position than any other beneficiary
since § 55-a placed no upper limit on the amount of insurance exempted. The Court of
Appeals shortly thereafter held that with respect to any conflict between the two sections,
§ 52 was impliedly repealed. Chatham Phenix Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Crosney, 251
N. Y. 189, 167 N. E. 217 (1929). It was not until 1939, however, with the passage of § 166
of the new Insurance Law that the two sections were merged and the anomaly officially
removed. N. Y. INs. LAW § 166 (McKinney, 1940). See Fraenkel, Creditors' Rights in
Life Inmrance, 4 ForD. L. REv. 35, 40-5 (1935) ; Pierson, supra note 12, at 23.
29. Under these married women's statutes, "old line" and fraternal benefit association
policies-i.e. those having neither change of beneficiary nor revesting clauses-were said
to confer a "vested" interest in the wife beneficiary, payable to her estate on her prior
death. Phoenix Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 46 Conn. 79, 33 Am. Rep. 14 (1878) ; In re
Peckham, 29 R. I. 250, 69 At!. 1002 (1908) ; Condon v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 Iowa
658, 166 N. W. 452 (1918) ; similarly, if the wife is a party to the insurance contract, and
has paid the premiums the proceeds will descend to her estate. Swan v. Snow, 11 Allen
224. (Mass. 1866) ; Hutson v. Merrifield, 51 Ind. 24 (1875) ; Neary v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 92 Conn. 488, 103 At!. 661 (1918). Contra: Ryan v. Rothweiler, 50 Ohio St. 595,
35 N. E. 679 (1893) ; Handwerker v. .Diermeyer, 96 Tenn. 619, 36 S. W. 869 (1896)
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By interpreting an apparently ambiguous statute without reference to its
purpose or legislative history, the court not only reached a result contrary to
virtually all authority but also handed the beneficiary's representatives a wind-
fall unjustified by either the insured's intent or public policy. Had the in-
sured intended to avoid the reversion of the proceeds, he could simply have
changed the beneficiary. His failure so to do during the eight years following
his wife's death would seem to indicate an assumption that the proceeds would
be distributed as part of his own estate. Admittedly, an exercise of the change
of beneficiary clause would have terminated all rights of his wife's estate.
There seems no reason why the insured should not have relied with equal
confidence on the companion revesting clause to prevent such rights from ever
accruing. 0 Though he may not have been acquainted with the law, on the sub-
ject, it is not unreasonable to assume he was aware of the institutional practice
of giving full effect to such a clause.a Nor have reasons sounding in public
policy heretofore been advanced to support the result of the Kindlebergcr
case 32 Since the beneficiary must die before the revesting clause can become
Bradshaw v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 187 N. Y. 347, 80 N. E. 203 (1907). See 2 AaPzEtA, ,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 1123; 7 COoLxy, op. cit. supra note 2, at 6342-5.
Where the policy has contained the qualifying clauses, however, the wife's position has
been considered no different from that of any other beneficiary, and her representatives
have been given no claim to the proceeds in event of her prior death. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A2d 340, (1946) ; Hamblin's Adm'x v. Hamblin's
Adm'r, 241 Ky. 447, 44 SAV2d 299 (1931) cited supra note 17; cf. Staunton v. Provident
Life and Accident Ins. Co. 69 Ohio App. 27, 42 N.E.2d 687 (1941) (proceeds to husband's
administrator where husband killed wife and then himself). See also cases cited note 19
supra.
30. The majority of the court, however, seemed to feel that the insured's failure to take
positive steps to change the beneficiary during the years subsequent to his wife's death in-
dicated an intent on-his part that the proceeds should be distributed in accordance with the
language of the statute, with which he was presumed to be familiar. 155 F2d 231, 225
(App. D.C. 1946). Yet, even conceding familiarity with the statute, it would seem more
reasonable to assume that the insured relied on the overwhelming line of authority which
had previously interpreted similar statutes to reach a result exactly opposite from that of
the D. C. court.
31. Virtually all legal reserve policies today contain both revesting and change of
beneficiary clauses. See note 1 supra. That the proceeds go to the estate of the insured has
not been considered open to question. See GLEs, Your MowNa AND YoUR LIr- Iz:suntzcE
118 (1935), advising policy-holders to name a contingent (secondary) beneficiary, lest the
primary beneficiary die first and the proceeds be distributed as part of the insured's estate by
the laws of descent rather than in accordance with his desires. The Life Insurance Associa-
tion of America and the National Association of Life Underwriters submitted a brief, amict.s
curiae, in support of a petition for rehearing, to which were appended affidavits of four major
life insurance companies (Aetna, Connecticut Mutual, Phoenix Mutual and The Travell-
ers), all reiterating that the universal practice was to pay over the proceeds to the in-
sured's estate in event of prior death of the beneficiary. Brief of Andcus Curiae (in support
of appellee's application for a rehearing), pp. 29-33, Kindleberger v. Lincoln National
Bank, 155 F.2d 281 (App. D.C., 1946).
32. The legal reserve life insurance companies have not been immune from attacl, but
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operative, he gets no added protection from the decision. Moreover, the gains
of the beneficiary's representatives will often be at the expense of the in-
sured's creditors, whose rights are already severely circumscribed. 83 If fur-
ther limitation of their rights is deemed desirable, it should at least be sanc-
tioned by an explicit expression of legislative intent rather than by strained
judicial construction and the vagaries of a misplaced comma.8 4
LONG-TERM LEASES AND CHAPTER X
REORGANIZATIONS: AN EXPANDED
CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION"'
With the enactment of Chapter X1 of the Bankruptcy Act in 1938, it was
generally considered that reorganization legislation had been brought abreast
the problems of contemporary corporate finance.2 However, the question of
whether the reorganization courts' jurisdiction and power are yet adequate to
their critics have not decried the use of the revesting and change of beneficiary clauses'
See GESELL AND HowE, STUDY OF LEaA. RE ERv LIE INSURANCE COMPANIES (TNEC
Monograph 28, 1940). See also, in a more vitriolic vein, GILBERT AND GILDERT, LiF IN-
suRANcE; A LEGALIZED RACKET (1936). For an antidote see SPEicHER, TnE TRuT11
ABOUT INSURANCE 97 (1936) ("Liberalized by a hundred years of experience, broadened
by competition, safeguarded by the activities of legislatures and insurance commissioners,
inspired by the spirit of trusteeship which dominates the companies, the life insurance con-
tract of today is the most marvelous and most liberal contract of personal finance ever
devised.")
33. See material and authorities, notk 12 mtpra. It has, in fact, been suggested that
the present statutes put creditors of the insured in too disfavored a position. See the ac-
count of Webb, J., In re Whiting, 3 F.2d 440, 443 (W.D.N.C. 1925). See also MACLFAN,
LIFE INSURANICE 467 (1935) ; Wells, The "Change of Beneficiary" Clause in Life Insur.
ance Policies 2 VA. L. Rav. 49, 50 (1914) ; Note 3 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 303, 310 (1936).
34. At the present time bills are pending-H.R. 1633 and H.R, 1635-which will re-
vise the statute to eliminate the ambiguity which occasioned the result in the principal
case; efforts are also being made to revise in like manner all the state statutes similarly
worded. Communication to Yale Law Journal from Mr. Henry R. Glenn, general counsel
for the Life Insurance Association of America.
* In re Pittsburgh Rys., 155 F.2d 477 (C.C.A. 3d 1946), cert. denied sub nora, Phil-
adelphia Co. v. Guggenheim, 67 Sup. Ct. 89 (1946) 60 HARV. L. Ray, 140 (1946) ; Note,
47 COL. L. Rzv. 109 (1947).
1. 52 STAT. 883-905 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1940). References to the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1938 with amendments to July 1, 1946 will hereinafter be cited by section
number only.
2. See 6 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1947, Matthew Bender & Co. page-proof)
II 0.01; Douglas, Improvement in Federal Procedure for Corporate Reorganizations, 24
A.B.A.J. 875, 876 (1938); Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Se-
,curities and Exchange Commission ins the Administratim of Chapter X of the Bank.
ruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 317, 350-1 (1941) ; Wham, Some Rdcent Developentcts
it Corporate Reorganizations, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rav. 352, 365 (1941).
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handle a commonly recurrent problem in the rehabilitation of corporate debt-
ors is raised by In re Pittsburgh Railways.a The Third Circuit there found
it necessary broadly to expand commonly accepted concepts of jurisdiction
in order to achieve a desirable reorganization plan for a public utility debtor.
The debtor, Pittsburgh Railways Company, is the operating company in
the corporate pyramid embracing the street railway system of Pittsburgh.
It is the wholly owned subsidiary of the Philadelphia Company, a public
utility holding company. In 1902 the Philadelphia Company effected a unified
system of transportation within the city of Pittsburgh by combining with
the debtor operating company forty-nine underlying street railway companies
through long-term leases and other agreements. Nine of the underliers--
the crucial group for the purposes of this case--executed to the debtor 900-
year leases of their properties, franchises, and equipment on which the Phil-
adelphia Company guaranteed, in default of payment by the lessee, dividends
on their stock, principal and interest on their bonds, corporate expenses, and
taxes. The securities of these "guaranteed underliers" are owned by the
general public. All the underlying street railway companies except those
supported by the guaranteed payments are insolvent.' But, since the Phil-
adelphia Company has assumed its obligations under the lease guarantees,
the "guaranteed underliers" are all in a highly prosperous condition.
In 1938 the debtor, Pittsburgh Railways, filed a voluntary petition in
reorganization under Chapter X, and since that date Pittsburgh's street rail-
way system has been operated by the reorganization trustees. The trustees
proposed a system-wide plan of reorganization providing for the merger of all
the underlying street railways into a single new corporation." It vras felt that
in this way the complex corporate structure could best be simplified and a
means provided for reducing the burdensome fixed charges of the system.T
As the guaranteed underliers would not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction
of the reorganization court, the City of Pittsburgh, in the public interest and
as a creditor of the debtor, petitioned the court to assert jurisdiction over
them and thus compel their participation in the proceedings.
Section 111 of Chapter X provides that "the court in which a petition is
filed shall .. .have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property,
wherever located." Thus, bringing the underliers within the scope of the re-
3. 155 F2d 477 (C.CA. 3d 1946).
4. Of the thirty-six underliers whose stock is owned by the Philadelphia Com-
pany, all but six are insolvent and even those six have no funds or credits. Special
Master's Report filed in Reorganization Proceedings No. 2225 in BankTuptcy, U 55
(W.D. Pa. 1945) (hereinafter cited as S.M.R.). The four unguaranteed underliers .vhose
stock is publicly owned are also insolvent. S.M.R. f 56.
5. In re Pittsburgh Rys., 155 F.2d 477, 481 (C.C.A. 3d 1946); S.M.R. 57.
6. Amended Revised Plan of Reorganization, with all Amendments to Uarch 1,
1942, filed in Reorganization Proceedings No. 20225 in Bankruptcy (W.D. Pa.).
7. Brief for Trustee, pp. 9-11, In re Pittsburgh Rys., 155 F.2d 477 (C.C.A. 3d
1946).
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organization court's jurisdiction necessarily involves a determination that
their property, franchises, and other assets are "property of the debtor"
within the meaning of this section. The Third Circuit, reversing the district
judge," achieved this result by disregarding the separate corporate entities of
the underliers. The Court went on to say that since it was concerned "with
the sweep of a federal statute dealing with a subject in which the Congress,
under the Constitution, is empowered to act", it was not bound by Penn-
sylvania real property law in determining the ownership of the reversion in
the leases.9 It did not, however, develop this argument into an affirmative alter-
native holding and say that there was authority in federal law for treating
the underliers' interest in the reversion as property of the debtor.
To preclude the court from disregarding the separate corporations, the
underliers argued that the law of the case had been established by a previous
decision ° holding that the separate corporate entities of this system were to
be respected in determining the trustees' liability for tax payments. Noting
that the corporate fiction may with propriety be rcognized for some purposes
and disregarded for others, the Court properly rejected this argument." That
the underliers were mere corporate shells acting only as conduits for distrib-
uting dividends and interest to their security holders12 furnishes further
support for the Court's holding. The physical properties of the underliers had
been inextricably commingled in the unified system.43 Separate operation
by the individual underliers would be highly impractical and probably im-
possible.14 Thus it is arguable that functionally a de facto merger had taken
place.
Yet pre-existing doctrine would appear to have compelled a contrary con-
clusion. While the circumstances under which courts have pierced corporate
8. In re Pittsburgh Rys., 60 F.Supp. 600 (W.D. Pa, 1945).
9. In re Pittsburgh Rys., 155 F.2d 477, 483 (C.C.A. 3d 1946).
10. Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168 (1941), 50 YALE L.J. 1254, 1259.
11. Compare Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.S. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549
(1922) with United States v. Walter, 263 U.S. 15 (1923). See Higgins v. Smith, 308
U.S. 473, 477 (1940) ; Corsicana Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 88 (1919) ; Paymer
v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334, 336 (C.C.A. 2d 1945); Irving Trust Co. v. Kaminsky,
22 F. Supp. 362, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
12. See S.M.R. ff 865. "[T]he typical lessor is little more than a corporate shell,
whose activities, save for such formal acts as are needed to maintain its corporate ex-
istence, have almost ceased." Meek and Masten, Railroad Leases and Reorganiatlion: I,
49 YALE L.J. 626, 652 (1940). See id. at 636-8; Rood, 'Protecting thie User Interest in
Railroad Reorganization, 7 LAW & CoNMIP. PROB. 495, 499 (1940).
13. Their routes had been altered (S.M.R. 111684, 834, 852), tracks had been aban-
doned leaving gaps in their franchise lines (S.M.R. 111 692(2), 834), much of their real
estate had been disposed of (S.M.R. 111 834, 849, 858), power plants had been sold
(S.M.R. 1 512), bridges had been disposed of (S.M.R. 11 848), and almost all their
rolling stock had been scrapped (S.M.R. 1111 834, 848, 851). None of the guaranteed
underliers had kept any record of their property since 1902 (S.M.R. Iff 842, 859, 873).
14. See S.M.R. 1111 751-5, 880.
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form are varied and the rules unsettled,'5 a parent-subsidiary relationship
by stock control has always been thought a condition precedent.'0 With this as a
datum, the disregard of the separate corporate existence of the subsidiary has
been justified most frequently on the rationale that the subsidiary is a mere
department, instrumentality, or agent of the parent.'7 In the instant case,
however, the guaranteed underliers had not only been scrupulous in main-
taining corporate individuality,38 but also were not stock-controlled by any
of the system corporations. Disregard of their separate existence thus repre-
sents a step considerably beyond the established law. °
Unfortunately the Circuit Court did not elaborate on its second contention
15. "An examination of the cases shows that the courts have laid down no con-
venient rule of thumb which might furnish a safe and accurate test." Note, 4 Aina.'. L. Rnv.
219, 221 (1920). For similar statements, see Wang, The Corporate Entity Concept (or Fic-
tion Theory) and the Modern, Bsiness Organization, 28 Mix. L. REi. 341 (1944) ; Worm-
ser, Piercing The Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 CoL. L. Rrv. 496 (1912). On the subject of
the corporate entity concept, see generally Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsi-
diary Corporations, 14 CALIn. I- R:v 12 (1925) ; Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the
Corporate Entity Theory, 17 CoL L. REv. 128 (1917) ; Dix, The Armor of the Juridical Con-
ception, 34 GEo. L. J. 432 (1946) ; Douglas and Shanks, Insulation Iron Liability, through
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L. J. 193 (1929) ; Timberg, Corporate Fictions, Logical,
Social amd International Implications, 46 CoL. L. REv. 533 (1946) ; Wang, supra; Wormser,
supra; Comment, 36 Yu.x L.J. 254 (1926) ; Notes, 47 CoL. L. REV. 109 (1947) ; 4 M1mx. L.
REv. 219 (1920).
16. In discussing the circumstances under which claimants against the subsidiary may
reach the parent, Douglas and Shanks state that "[o]wnership of all or a majority of the
stock of the subsidiary ... appears as a constant. ... Othenvise the problem would
normally not arise." Douglas and Shanks, supra note 15, at 196. See id. at 211.
17. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (19-20) (separate corporations used to
evade Hepburn Act); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n,
247 U.S. 490 (1918) (separate corporations used to effect discriminatory freight rates);
In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 Fed. 609 (S. D. Ohio 1907); In re Muncie Pulp
Co., 139 Fed. 546 (C.C.A. 2d 1905); see Stone v. Eacho, 12 F.2d 284, 28 (C.C.A. 4th
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942).
Numerous criteria have been evolved for determining the existence or nonexistence
of this relationship. See Douglas and Shanks, supra note 15, at 195 n.8, 195-7, 217-8;
Note, 4 MimN. L. Ray. 219, 221 (1920). Illustrations of use of the criteria are, Taylor v.
Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939) (intervention in affairs of subsidiary);
Luckenback S. S. Co. v. V. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C.C.A. 4th 1920) (lad: of
adequate financial structure for subsidary); Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 234 (C.C.A. 4th
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942) (commingling of assets and accounts).
18. They maintained separate books and accounts, had separate officers and directors,
and were highly solvent and profitable corporations. In re Pittsburgh Rys., 155 F2d 477,
481 (C.C.A. 3d 1946). Neither the Philadelphia Company nor Pittsburgh Rail ays had
influenced their policy making (in fact the guaranteed underliers had sued the Philadel-
phia Company on several occasions, S. If. R. I 861-2), and there was no suggestion of
fraud or bad faith.
19. Commenting on the instant case, Professor J. NV. Moore says that the court
"seems to have gone beyond permissible limits in disregarding corporate entities...
6 CoLLIER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 630 n. 7.
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that it was not controlled by state real property law. An argument might have
been made that since the provisions of Section 111 are jurisdictional and
since state law can not circumscribe the jurisdiction of federal courts,20 the
reorganization court was not bound by Pennsylvania precedents in determin-
ing'whether it had jurisdiction over the reversion in the leases. 2 ' Pursuing
this argument, the court might have reasoned that under the Bankruptcy Act
a reorganization court has the jurisdiction requisite to forestall any action
which "would seriously embarass and probably prevent the formulation and
consummation of a plan of reorganization" ;2 that the guaranteed underliers'
refusal to join in the reorganization was clearly threatening to do just that ;23
and that accordingly there was authority to include them in the reorganization
plan. Since in many aspects of bankruptcy administration federal courts are
not bound by state law, analogous precedent might have been found.
24
But so to have argued would have been to ignore the fact that no matter
in what sense used-jurisdictional or otherwise-"property" must be defined
in some frame of reference. Since Chapter X furnishes no indices of prop-
20. Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) ; Suydam v. Broadnax,
14 Pet. 67, 74 (U.S. 1840) (alternative holding); see Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castle-
man, 215 U.S. 437, 443 (1910). But cf. Harris v. Zion's Saving Bank & Trust Co., 317
U.S. 447 (1943) (by implication), 43 Cor. L. RPv. 516.
21. An analogy might be drawn from the judicial administration of the internal reve-
nue laws. Just as there the courts will not allow the legal form employed to defeat the
over-riding policy consideration that each citizen must pay his fair share of taxes, so it
might be said that the doctrinal form in which corporation lawyers choose to frame their
inter-corporate alliances will not be allowed to defeat the federal policy that a reorgani-
zation plan must be fair, equitable, and feasible. (Bankruptcy Act, Section 216). Thus
while recognizing that property may belong to a valid family partnership under state law,
the Supreme Court has treated it as belonging to the partners individually for purposes of
income taxation. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Lusthaus v. Commis-
sioner, 327 U.S. 293 (1946).
22. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294
U.S. 648, 678 (1935).
23. The four underliers whose stock was held by the general public but whose leases
were not guaranteed had voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction. The objection
of the thirty-six underliers whose stock was owned by the Philadephia Company was
purely technical. See Brief for SEC, pp. 9-11, In re Pittsburgh Rys., 155 F.2d 477
(C.C.A. 3d 1946). Thus the guaranteed underliers were the only ones who were seriously
impeding the formulation of a system-wide plan.
24. Thus, in determining what claims are allowable, what claims are provable, and
how a bankrupt's assets shall be distributed, a bankruptcy court does not apply the law of
the state where it sits but follows federal law. Vanston Bondholders Protective Commit-
tee v. Green, 67 Sup. Ct. 237 (1946), rehearing denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 497 (1947) ; Heiser v.
Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946) ; American Surety Co. v. Sampsell, 327 U.S. 269 (1946) ;
Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942). And a plan of reorganization
approved by a bankruptcy court may disregard valid state statutes that are inimical to
the public interest in the reorganization. In re New York, N, H. & H. R. R., 147 F.2d




erty,25 it would seem that the only ready-made criteria are to be found in
state law, under which the property relationships were created. And it has
long been well settled that, even in the interpretation of federal statutes, fed-
eral courts are relegated to the state precedents of real property law. -0 Thus
in its assertion that it was not bound by Pennsylvania law, the court appears
to have taken a questionable position.27
Furthermore, long term leases are well established in the legal syntax of
corporate law, and their implications have always been respected by the
courts 28 Though jurisdiction over the lessee's leasehold estate has enabled the
25. To circumvent narrow and diverse judicial constructions of the word "property"
in subsection 75(n) of the Bankruptcy Act, Congress amended that subsection in 1935 to
broaden the scope of the interests included within the term "property". As now defined
in subsection 75(n), property of the debtor includes "all real or personal property, or any
equity or right in any such property, including, among others, contracts for purchase,
contracts for deed, or conditional sales contracts, the right or the equity of redemption
where the period of redemption has not or had not expired, or where a deed of trust has
been given as security, or where the sale has not or had not been confirmed, or where
deed had not been delivered, at the time of filing the petition." See S Corzm-, BA%:.-
Rurrcy 182-90 (14th ed. 1943). But even under this expanded definition bankruptcy
courts look to state law to determine the existence of these defined interests. State Bank
of Hardinsburg v. Brown, 317 U.S. 135 (1942), 18 IxD. L. J. 239 (1943). But ef. WVragg
v. Federal Land Bank, 317 U.S. 325, 328-9 (1943).
26. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); United States v.
Crosby, 7 Cranch 115 (U.S. 1812) ; Laugharn v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings
Ass'n, 88 F2d 551 (C.C.A. 9th 1937) ; In re Barnett, 12 F2d 73 (C.C.A. 2d 1926). But
cf. Wragg v. Federal Land Bank, 317 U.S. 325, 328-9 (1943) (See note 25 spra).
In support of its conclusion that it was not bound by the state law of real property,
the court cited, at 155 F.2d 483 n.13, Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: the Brood-
ing Onuipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YAui L. J. 267 (1946). In the same article,
however, Judge Clark notes that much of the law of bankruptcy administration "depends
on interpretation of local law, statutory or common, involving such matters as conditional
sales, chattel mortgages, conveyances in fraud of creditors, pledges, and so on....
[Tihese are matters of local property law which even under the Tyson doctrine were
relegated to the state precedents." Id. at 281.
However, as Judge Clark points out, not only are federal courts freed from state
precedents in some aspects of bankruptcy administration (see note 24 supra), but the rule
of Erie R., v. Tompklns, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) has been whittled away in recent years by
the development of what Judge Clark has called the "federal fields." See Clark, .supra at
284; 43 CoL L. REv. 520, 521 n.8-10 (1943).
27. A more tenable position might have been for the court to concede that although it
was bound by state law nevertheless in the peculiar facts of this case state law justified
treating the lessor's property as that of the debtor. Thus it might have been argued that
in acquiescing in the commingling of their property in the system assets and in permitting
their routes to be altered and tracks to be abandoned (see note 13 supra), the underliers
had waived their right to be considered the owners of the reversion.
28. "Since conveyancers and business men alike have long utilized the characteristic
provisions of leases to accomplish transfers of rights in real estate for extensive periods
without payment of the purchase price, such long term agreements have become a well
recognized legal implement, especially in corporate realty transactions and railroad con-
solidations and mergers. Its reservations of rent, provisions for taxes and operation are
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courts to exercise some power over the lessor,29 they have consistently paid
doctrinal obeisance to the lessor's ownership of the reversion.
However tenuous the court's doctrinal argument may be, the result in the
instant case nonetheless appears highly desirable. By providing a means of
radically reducing fixed charges, it enabled the street railway system of Pitts-
burgh to be re-established on a sound financial basis and thus assured the
.continuance of adequate, co-ordinated service to the travelling public. But
the holding will probably not be extended. Here the unique facts made the
result almost inescapable. First, since separate operation by the underliers
was not feasible, the debtor had to operate the system. Second, because of
the guarantee by a solvent third party, there was no alternative method of
dealing with the guaranteed underliers and of reducing the fixed charges.
The threat of rejection, normally a powerful weapon in persuading lessors
to renegotiate, 30 was rendered ineffective. Where these compelling facts are
not present and rejection remains a practical mode of inducing rental re-
duction, it seems unlikely that the tenuous doctrinal argument here forced on
the court will be re-employed. I
Accordingly it is submitted that Chapter X be amended to give the courts
authority in public utility reorganizations to include long-term lessors in the
reorganization where such inclusion is certified by the commission having
regulatory jurisdiction to be in the public interest.81 Such an amendment
firmly imbedded in our financial, corporate and title structures." Palmer v. Connecticut
Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544, 555 (1941).
29. Thus the courts have enforced a lien on the lessor's property even after the lease
has been rejected. Warren v. Palmer, 310 U.S. 132 (1940), discussed in Note, 18
N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 399, 428 (1941). They have prevented a lessor from terminating a
short-term trackage agreement even though termination was authorized in the terms of
the lease. Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134 (1946) (lessor denied right to
end trackage agreement terminable on twelve months notice until prior approval of I.C.C.
obtained); Smith v. Hoboken R.R., Warehouse & S.S, Connecting Co., 328 U.S. 123
(1946) (although covenant providing for termination of long-term lease if assigned
through bankruptcy had been breached, lessor denied right to retake property until prior
approval of I.C.C. obtained). And they have compelled the bondholders of the lessor to
accept with less than unanimous consent new securities of reduced value from the debtor-
lessee. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P., & P.R.R., 318 U.S, 523,
546-55 (1943).
30. In the usual long-term lease there is either no guarantee (Meek and Masten,
supra note 12, at 631-6), or the lessee itself is the guarantor, in the sense that it stamps
"guaranteed" on the lessor's securities (see New York Trust Co. v. New York & Green-
wood Lake Ry., 156 F.2d 701, 702 (C.C.A. 3d 1946), or the guarantor is a corporation so
closely tied to the lessee that it cannot remain solvent while the lessee is insolvent. In
these situations, the threat of rejection is a threat of cutting off all the lessor's income.
However, in the instant case the Philadelphia Company had other public utility interests
(S.M.R. 1 17) which insured its solvency regardless of the financial status of the Pitts-
burgh Railways. From all that appears, the Philadelphia Company could pay its obliga-
tions under the guarantee for an indefinite period. Thus the threat of rejection was not
persuasive with the guaranteed underliers.
31. Long-term lessors are already included within the definition of subsidiary in See-
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would adjust legal doctrine to functional realities. The long-term lease has
been said to be a mere alternative to a mortgage as a method of financing
the acquisition of property 32 And it is recognized in the railroad industry
as serving the same purpose as a merger, consolidation, or sale of assets.pa
These pragmatic similarities would seem to militate for similarity of treat-
ment .3
tion 106(13) of Chapter X. Section 129 permits them to reorganize in the same court
with their parent. Moreover, a petition by or against the subsidiary may be filed in the
parent's proceeding. In re Realty Associates Securities Corp., 55 F.Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y.
1944). And two proceedings in the same court involving a parent and subsidiary may be
ordered consolidated. In re Mallow Hotel Corp., 17 F. Supp. 877 (ILD.Pa. 1937). See 6
CoLLma, op. cit. supra note 2, 4.12.
Furthermore, Section 177 provides that, in the case of a public utility other than an
intrastate public utility, the commission having regulatory jurisdiction may suggest
amendments and offer objections to a plan. And Section 178 specifies that a condition
precedent to judicial acceptance of any plan for the reorganization of an intra-state public
utility is the prior approval of that plan by the state public utility commission. See 6 CoL-
LmE, op. cit. supra note 2, 1 7.34. In fact, in the instant case the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission had approved unitary reorganization for the Pittsburgh street rail-
way system. See 22 DEcsioxs oF PA. P. U. C. 67, 73 (1940) ; 23 id. at 65 (1941) ; 23 id.
at 309 (1942). Unitary reorganization was also urged by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See Brief for SEC, pp. 2-11, In re Pittsburgh Rys., 115 F2d 477 (C.C.A.
3d 1946).
Since the problem would arise with greater frequency in the reorganization of inter-
state railroads, this suggests a similar amendment to Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.
32. See Douglas and Frank, Landlords' Clai= it; Reorganications, 42 Y,,.n L. J. 1003,
1049 (1933) ; Meck and Masten, supra note 12, at 630-1; Comment, 48 YA.E L. J. 1400,
1406-11 (1939) (pointing out the relative merits of the lease and the mortgage). A few
cases support this view. In re Hotel Gibson Co., 11 F.Supp. 30 (S.D. Ohio 1935) (lessor's
interest under a 99-year lease renewable forever held a security device with lessor as se-
cured creditor of debtor-lessee) ; It re Euclid Doan Co., 104 F.2d 712 (C.C.A. 6th 1939)
(under the peculiar facts a 99-year lease renewable forever construed as a mortgage);
Note 52 H.Av. L. REv. 1149, 1153 n.29 (1939).
33. See Meck and Masten, supra note 12, at 628-30.
34. See dissenting opinion of Douglas, J. in Palmer v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting
Co., 311 U.S. 544, 563 (1941).
In some jurisdictions, it is recognized, for purposes of taxation, that there is no prac-
tical distinction between a lessee under a long-term lease and a fee-simple owner and the
lessee is accordingly so treated. Ohio: OHio GENERAL CDE § 5330 (Page, 1945) ; Village
of St. Bernard v. Kemper, 60 Ohio St. 244, 54 N.E. 267, 45 L.R.A. 662 (1899) (other
than tax purposes); Cincinnati College v. Yeatman, 30 Ohio St. 276 (1876) ; see Loring
v. Melendey, 11 Ohio 355, 358 (1842). Connecticut: Connecticut Spiritualist Camp Meet-
ing Ass'n v. East Lyme, 54 Conn. 152 (1836). Pennsylvania: Philadelphia Library Co. v.
Ingham, 1 Whart. 72 (Pa. 1836). Note, 55 A.L.R. 154 (1928).
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FEDERAL QUESTION-THE JURISDICTIONAL ENIGMA
OF THE INSUFFICIENT COMPLAINT*
Propriety of jurisdiction must be the first inquiry of a federal court. But
where jurisdiction is allegedly grounded on a federal claim, an enigma results
in that this initial question seems inextricably related to the validity of the
cause of action stated. Thus, adjudication of a damage suit brought under a
federal regulatory statute, which does not expressly impose civil liability,
necessarily involves determination of whether a private remedy is implicit.
Resolution of this question may then equally be considered an interpretation
of the act on the merits, or a jurisdictional decision as to the existence of a
federal questions
The logical difficulties and implications of this problem are illustrated by
Dowzning v. Howard.2 A minority stockholder in the United Corporation
brought a derivative suit against former and present directors and third
parties, alleged to have deliberately violated the Public Utilities Holding Com-
pany Act.3 Plaintiff charged that prior to registration with the SEC, United
had owned and voted securities of subsidiaries and had acquired shares in a
company formed by consolidation of two subsidiaries-actions which Section
4(a) made unlawful for unregistered companies. 4 This unlawful activity was
said to implement a conspiracy whereby defendant bankers continued to con-
trol United so as to retain its profitable financial business.5 By reason of the
shrinkage in value of the securities thus illegally owned, the loss of dividends
under the merger agreement, and the profits of the bankers at the expense of
United, damages were claimed in the sum of $100,000,000.
Upon defendants' appearance to attack the jurisdiction,0 the district court
dismissed the complaint, stating that the action was simply a traditional suit
* Downing v. Howard, 68 F. Supp. 6 (D. Del. 1946), appeal filed, Feb. 20, 1947,
1. See 1 MoopE, FEDERAL. PRACrICE 178 (1938); SIMKINS, FEDERAL PaAcTIcE 35-6
(1938).
2. 68 F. Supp. 6 (D. Del. 1946).
3. 49 STAr. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 ct seq. (1940) (hereafter referred to as the
Act).
4. Section 4(a) makes it unlawful for a holding company not registered under Sec-
tion 5 to carry on most of the normal activities of a holding company, including holding,
owning, or acquiring securities of any subsidiary company. 49 STAT. 812 (1935), 15
U.S.C. §79d(a) (1940).
The complaint also alleged a violation § 11(e), 49 STAT. 822 (1935), 15 U.S,C,
§ 79k(e) (1940), which allows any registered holding company to submit a plan for
divestment of control, securities or other assets. The court noted a previous decision con-
struing this section as permissive, not mandatory, and thus refused jurisdiction of that
claim. Commonwealth & Southern Corp. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 747, 751 (C.C.A. 3d 1943).
See note 26 infra.
5. For the history of United's organization by banking groups, see The United Corp.,
13 S.E.C. 854, 856-71 (1943).
6. Under FED. R Civ. P., 12 (b) (1)-(5).
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for breach of fiduciary duty and not an action to enforce any duty or liability
under the Act. The court reasoned that the transactions complained of would
have been legal had United registered, yet the loss would have been the same.
Thus the real cause of the loss could not have been the violation of the statute.
Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff had no standing to sue because
the Act gave no private right of action for a violation of Section 4(a). Since
the court determined that on either ground this was not a case arising under
the laws of the United States, the dismissal -as stated to be for lack of
jurisdiction.7
The denial of plaintiff's standing to sue seems to run counter to the current
of decisions, which has expanded rather than contracted the kinds of actions
which may be brought to seek redress for violations of this and related legisla-
tion.8 The court's decision was based on three grounds: (1) the specific sanc-
tions provided in the Act do not include a private damage suit for violation of
Section 4(a),0 whereas for two other violations Congress explicitly granted a
private remedy -") (2) the purpose of Section 4(a) is to enforce compliance
with the registration provisions of Section 5 ;11 and (3) the SEC has the pri-
wnary duty of enforcing the Act. This rationale should be contrasted with that
of the Second Circuit in Goldstein v. GrocsbcCk,12 in which a minority stock-
holder recovered, on behalf of a subsidiary, money paid to a parent holding
company under a contract illegal under Section 4(a).1 3 There the court de-
clared that the specific sanctions provided by the Act were inadequate to carry
out its purpose, that the SEC's usual jurisdiction should not preclude supple-
mental judicial remedies, and that ... a denial of a private right of action
7. Diversity jurisdiction was lacking because three defendants were citizens of the
same state as plaintiff. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (U.S. 1805). See 1 Mo0.uTm,
FEDEAL PAcricE 481 (1938).
8. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F2d 422 (C.C.A. 2d 1944), cerl. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944) (stockholder's suit under Holding Company Act); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d
238 (C.C.A. 2d 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) [private suit for violation of
§ 6(a) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 STAT. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1)
(1940)]; Geismar v. Bond & Goodin, 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) [action for
violation of § 15(c) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 52 STAT. 1075 (193S), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c) (1) (1940)]. But cf. Weinberger v. Semenenko, 36 N.Y.S. 2d 395 (Sup. Ct.
1942) (stockholder's suit under Holding Company Act).
Whether a statute of this type grants a private right of action has been analogized
to the tort problem of determining who the statute vras designed to protect. Steckler v.
Pennroad Corp., 136 F.2d 197, 201 (C.C.A. 3d 1943), cert. dcenid, 320 U.S. 757 (1943).
See REsTAE -m&T, ToRTs § 28S (1934).
9. The specific sanctions are injunction at instance of the SEC criminal punishment,
and invalidation of contracts in violation of the Act. 49 STAT. 832, 835 (1935), 15 U.S.C.
79r(f), 79z(b), 79z-3 (1940).
10. 49 STAT. 829, 830 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79p, 79q(b) (1940).
11. See Sax. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1935) ; H.R Ra,. No. 1318, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935).
12. 142 F.2d 422 (C.C.A. 2d 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
13. See note 4 spra.
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to those for whose ultimate protection the legislation is intended leaves legisla-
tion highly publicized as in the public interest in fact sadly wanting, and even
delusive, to that end."'14 Similarly, since one of the purposes of the Act is to
protect holding company investors,' 5 it would seem that this policy would be
best served by granting a right of action to a representative of that group,
who claims injury from a violation of the Act.16
Although it may be argued that the plaintiff had standing to sue, that alone
would not dispose of the case, for, as the court pointed out, it is difficult to see
how the violations of the Act caused the loss to the corporation.17 Much more
important as a causative factor would seem to be the declining securities
market which coincided with the period of alleged illegality.18 Perhaps the
court would have been more willing to find a private remedy, if plaintiff had
presented a more persuasive claim for relief.
Whether the court was right or wrong in its determination that plaintiff
could not recover on his federal claim, the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
seems erroneous. The decision that there was no causal relation between the
violations of the Act and the loss is a determination that the facts alleged are
legally insufficient to state a cause of action. As such it requires a dismissal
on the merits just as if the court had decided after trial that the facts proven
were insufficient to allow recovery. 19 Admittedly, whenever a court decides
that plaintiff has not stated a good cause of action, doubts may arise as to the
substantiality of his federal claim; but if the court's action in this case were
correct, then jurisdiction would stand or fall on plaintiff's success or failure,
Jurisdiction, however, is the power to decide a case either way, not merely in
favor of the plaintiff.20
The refusal of a private action under Section 4(a) likewise necessitates a
dismissal on the merits, according to the latest Supreme Court doctrine. In
Bell v. Hood,2' neither referred to nor distinguished in the instant case, plain-
tiffs sought damages from agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
illegal-arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful searches and seizures, basing
14. 142 F2d 422, 427 (C.C.A. 2d 1944).
15. Cf. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. SEC, 126 F.2d 325, 327 (C.C.A. 2d 1942). And see
§ (b) of the Act, 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (1940) ; H.R. Doc No. 137,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) ; 79 CONG. Rmc. 10318-9 (1935).
16. Cf. cases cited note 8 supra; Deckert v. Independence Shares. Corp,, 311 U.S. 282,
287-8 (1940).
17. 68 F. Supp. 6, 10 (D.Del. 1946).
18. The history of United's security losses is detailed in The United Corp., 13 S.E.C.
854, 871-5 (1943).
19. Mosher v. City of Phoenix, 287 U.S. 29 (1932) ; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263
U.S. 291 (1923) ; Flanders v. Coleman, 250 U.S. 223 (1919); The Fair v. Kohler Die &
Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913); Pacific Electric Ry. v. Los Angeles, 194 U.S. 112
(1904) ; Illinois Central R.R. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 28 (1901); City Ry. v. Citizens' Street
R.R., 166 U.S. 557 (1897).
20. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
21. 327 U.S. 678 (1946), 41 ILL. L. Rv. 558 (1946).
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federal jurisdiction on violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The
district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the
Constitution did not provide for money recovery and that therefore there was
not involved a controversy arising under the federal Constitution, was re-
versed by the Supreme Court. The ratio decidendi was that plaintiff's right of
recovery depended upon the scope of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments'
protection, so that recovery would be had if the Amendments were construed
in one way, and denied if construed in another.m This was said to be a ques-
tion of law which could be decided only after the court had assumed jurisdic-
tion over the controversy.2 4 So, in the instant case, plaintiff's right of re-
covery depends upon the scope of the civil protection afforded by the Act.
Nor does plaintiff's claim seem to fall within the exceptions, noted in the Bell
case, that allow a federal court to refuse jurisdiction of a complaint seeking
recovery directly under a federal statute. For here the federal question is
neither immaterial,2 nor insubstantial or frivolous. -
That the dismissal of the federal claim ought to have -been on the merits
rather than on jurisdictional grounds imports more than a technical nicety in
the form of the decree. Where the cause of action is based on two grounds,
one of which presents a federal question and the other a question of state
common law, the court must normally adjudicate the non-federal claim even
though the federal claim is decided adversely to plaintiff.- T Thus in the
22. The district court's unreported opinion was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Bell v.
Hood, 150 F2d 96 (C.C.A. 9th 1945).
23. Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902) ; Hull v. Burr, 234 U.S. 712 (1914);
First Nat. Bank v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504 (1920) ; sce Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201 (1921) ; Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (19356);
cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933).
24. General Investment Co. v. New York Central R.R., 271 U.S. 223 (1926). But cf.
Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945); General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Temas
R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943).
25. Norton v. Whiteside, 239 U.S. 144 (1915) ; Meyer v. Kansas City, Southern Ry.,
84 F2d 411 (C.C.A. 2d 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 607 (1936) (allegations of violations
of anti-trust laws not relied on by plaintiff).
26. As where the question has been foreclosed by authoritative precedents. California
Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938) ; Levering & Garrigues Co.
v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933); Western Union v. Ann Arbor R.R., 178 U.S. 239
(1900) ; Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U.S. 170 (1923) ; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70 (1909) ;
Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285 (1910); Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co.
v. City of Bushnell, 109 F.2d, 26 (C.C.A. 7th 1940); Lund v. Woodenware Workers'
Union, 19 F. Supp. 607 (D. Minn. 1937). Or obviously does not present a federal claim.
Des Moines v. Des Moines City Ry., 214 U.S. 179 (1909) ; Newburyport Water Co. v.
Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561 (1904) ; Underground R.R. v. City of New York, 193 U.S.
416 (1904) ; McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168 (1899). See Chadbourne and Levin,
Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. oF PA. L. REv. 639 (1942).
27. The fullest exposition of this doctrine is set forth in Hum v. Oursler. 289 U.S.
238 (1933). E.g., Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909); Railroad Commis-
sion of California v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1938); Southern Pacific Co.
v. Van Hoosear, 72 F2d 903 (C.C.A. 9th 1934); People's Savings Bank v. Layman. 134
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instant case, having dismissed on the merits the federal ground for relief, the
court would have been required to hear the claim for breach of fiduciary
duty.28 This, of course, raises the objection presented in the Bell dissent2 9-
that it is unreasonable to require disposal of a question of federal law on the
merits where the only effect is to require the federal court to decide questions
of state law. Whereas in the Bell case the state question involved only a simple
trespass claim, in the instant case it presented one of the most time consuming
and complicated of common law actions.3 0 On the other hand, to the extent
that the instant decision becomes authoritative on the issue of civil liability,
a dismissal on the merits would have imposed the burden of local law decision
uniquely on this court. Henceforth, litigants pressing a similar claim tinder
the Act would be met with a valid jurisdictional bar under the doctrine that a
federal question is no longer substantial if it has been authoritatively decided
contrary.to their claim of right.81
It may be argued, moreover, that the plaintiff, without any prior decisions
pointing his error, has incurred the cost of presenting a bona fide claim under
federal law to a federal court and should not be remitted to another forum
for the adjudication of his other grounds. Considerations of efficiency and
economy require that all issues be decided by a single court instead of shunt-
ing the litigant from one forum to another.3 2 From the point of view of the
Fed. 635 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1905) ; cf. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593
(1926) (jurisdiction of counter-claim). Contra: Atkins v. Gordon, 86 F.2d 595 (C.C.A.
7th 1936). For discussion of the Hurn doctrine, see I Mooa, FEDERAL PArIcE 155 (1938) ;
Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations ots Federal Procedure, 45 YAL.
L.J. 393, 397 (1936) ; 52 YALE L.J. 922 (1943); Note, 40 HAV. L. REv. 298 (1926);
Comment,, 27 ILL L. REV. 816 (1933).
Compare with this doctrine, the cases in which federal courts postpone determination
of state law constitutionality until state cougts construe the statute, Railroad Commission
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) ; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168 (1942) ;
or delay granting an injunction against a state tax, Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin,
323 U.S. 101 (1944) ; or avoid unsettled local law questions, Thompson v, Magnolia PC-
troleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940) ; or decline to exercise equity jurisdiction, Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). See 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 180 (Supp. 1946);
Note, 53 YALE L. J. 788 (1944).
28. The application of the doctrine of Hum v. Oursler, supra note 27, depends upon
the breadth of the concept of the cause of action. See 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrcr 93
(Supp. 1946), for a criticism of the Second Circuit's narrow conception to avoid the de-
cision of state law questions, while purporting to follow the Hurn case.
Even if the court in the instant case, could have refused to hear the state law ques-
tion on the ground that it involved a separate cause of action, the actual decision demon-
strates that the problem was not even considered. In fact, the court noted that the trans-
actions complained of as violating federal law constituted facts showing a breach of
fiduciary duty.
29. 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946).
30. See WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCiKHOLDERS' DERvATIVE Surs 8
(Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, 1944).
31. See note 26 supra.
32. See Judge Clark, dissenting in Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d
9, 11 (C.C.A. 2d 1942).
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layman, it is also better that his claim be adjudicated on the merits rather than
disposed of by what must appear to him to be judicial sleight-of-hand. If the
plaintiff, relying on the dogma that a jurisdictional dismissal is not a judgment
on the merits and does not preclude a subsequent suit on the same cause of
action,a3 renews his claim under the Act in a state court,34 he may be met with
the bar of "direct" estoppel.3 Thus may a litigant be misled into accepting, as
without prejudice to his substantive rights, a dismissal that is actually conclu-
sive.36 Finally, the Bell case seems close enough in point to have compelled
considering the issues as questions of merit rather than of jurisdiction.
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONDUCT
OF A BUSINESS'
That one has a common law right "to conduct one's business without the
wrongful interference of others"' has been recognized at least since 1621.2
Three frequent types of violation of this right have been categorized as the
torts of "inducing breach of contract," "unfair competition," and "trade
libel."3 A fourth generic label, "wrongful interference with the conduct of a
33. Smith v. McNeal, 109 U.S. 426, 429 (183); FED. R. Cnv. P., 41 (b). See 2
FEEmxr, Jun asmwrs 1546 (1925).
34. Concurrent jurisdiction of actions to enforce a liability created by the Act is
granted to state courts. 49 STAT. 835 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §79y (1940).
35. The term "direct" estoppel is applied in the Restatement of Judgments to the
situation where a judgment has a binding effect on the matter litigated, although a subse-
quent suit on the same cause of action is not precluded. REsTAunMS;T, JUDGIm,?;s
§45(c), comment d (1942) ; id. at §49, comment b; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judg-
ment, 56 HAnv. L. REV. 1, 3 n.5 (1942). See Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & Miss. Ry., 142
U.S. 396, 410 (1892).
36. Cf. Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 (U.S. 1947).
* Munson Line v. Green, 6 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), and unpublished opinion, Jan.
22, 1947.
1. Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So.2d 383 (1943).
2. Garret v. Taylor, Cro. Jac. 567, 79 Eng. Rep. 485 (K.B. 1621) ; accord, Gregory
v. Duke of Brunswick, 6 Man. & G. 205, 134 Eng. Rep. E66 (C.P. 1843); Tarleton v.
McGawley, Peake N.P. 270, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793) ; Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11
Mod. 130, 88 Eng. Rep. 945 (K.B. 1707). See KENNEDY and Fnrn-wAd, Tim RIGnT To
TPaDE (1933) ; PRossrE, Toms, 1013-20 (1943) ; Green, Relational Interests, 29 Iur. L.
Ray. 460, 1041, 30 IaT. L. Rav. 1 (1935) ; Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IoriA L. Rv.
175, 196-213 (1936) ; Lewis, Should the Motive of the Defcrdant Affect the Question of
His Liability?, 5 CoL. L. Rav..107 (1905) ; Sarat Basak Principles of Liability for Inter-
ference with Trade, Profession or Calling, 28 L Q. RE%. 52 (1912); Terry, Malicious
Torts, 20 L.Q. Ray. 10 (1904).
3. Similar to "trade libel" are torts called "slander of title," "disparagement of
property," or "injurious falsehood."
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business," has been applied to a conglomerate of transactions often including
or overlapping the more crystallized torts. Its bounds vague and flexible, this
fourth cause of action may offer assistance to any businessman with a griev-
ance which does not fit the more familiar molds; it also presents a possible
occasion for evading policies embodied in the requirements for a cause of
action along more traditional lines.
Its cue taken from a line of recent New York decisions,4 the complaint in
Munuon Line v. Green5 was designed to state a claim for "wrongful interfer-
ence with the conduct of a business" as well as for malicious prosecution.7
The plaintiff Line alleged execution of a conspiracy to harass it into buying
stock owned by the defendants, and accordingly charged them with "willfully,
intentionally, and maliciously" damaging its business. The campaign against
the Line was allegedly conducted by instituting successive lawsuits "mali-
ciously and without probable cause," by threatening receivership and liquida-
tion, and by using false representations to induce suits by other stockholders.
The complaint further accused the defendants of making false allegations
intending that they would be republished in newspapers, of using confidential
information entrusted to Green as a director, of circulating rumors maligning
the integrity and ability of the Line's management, and of concealing the
identity of the real parties in interest so as to permit suit on acts which had
been approved by Green while a director and to permit allegations in one suit
inconsistent with those in another.
Because, under applicable law,s an action for malicious prosecution of a
civil suit would not lie without "special injury" involving harassment to an
extraordinary degree-as by arrest, attachment, or injunction--the court
4. Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187 (C.C.A, 2d
1943) ; American Guild of Musical Artists, Inc. v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E.2d 123
(1941); Opera On Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941); Federal
Waste Paper Corp. v. Garment Center Capitol, Inc., 268 App. Div. 230, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 26
(1st Dep't 1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 714, 61 N.E.2d 451 (1945).
5. 6 F.RD. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
6. The complaint merely set forth the facts alleged, and plaintiff's brief argued the
"wrongful interference" theory. Compare FED. R. Crv. P,, 8(a).
7. A third claim for relief was based on the contention that the defendants had been
guilty of criminal conspiracy under Section 580 of the New York Penal Law, which pro-
vides: "If two or more persons conspire ... falsely to institute or maintain an action or
special proceeding . . . each of them is guilty of a misdemeanor." The court rejected
plaintiff's assertion that a violation of this section gives rise to a civil action. But cf. Kel-
logg v. Sowerby, 190 N.Y. 370, 83 N.E. 47 (1907).
8. The conspiracy was allegedly conceived in New York, and the suits were brought
in Maryland and the District of Columbia. The court determined that the law of all three
jurisdictions was the same on the issues presented.
9. Peckham v. Union Finance Co., 48 F.2d 1016 (App. D.C. 1931); Supreme Lodge
American Protective League v. Unverzagt, 76 Md. 104, 24 Atl. 323 (1892); Paul v.
Fargo, 84 App. Div. 9. 82 N.Y. Supp. 369 (4th Dep't 1903). Contra: Pangburn v. Bull, 1
Wend. 345 (N.Y. 1828). See Note, 150 A.L.R. 897 (1944), citing cases from 12 states
and the District of Columbia in accord with and 18 states contrary to the rule here ap-
NOTES
dismissed the claim based on malicious prosecution. The alleged application
for the appointment of a receiver and the bringing of three successive guits, it
was held, cid not amount to the necessary "special injury."' 0
What saved the complaint was the claim for "wrongful interference with
the conduct of a business." Insisting that the plaintiff stated "more than a
glorified cause of action for malicious prosecution," the court based its ap-
proval of the claim on a conclusion that the tort of "wrongful interference"
was generally recognized and on the total lack of authority in bar.
Although the decisions cited by the court involved facts unlike those in the
case before it," other authorities seem clear that a general claim of unjustified
injury to the business, credit and reputation of the plaintiff is enough to bring
a case within the range of interests protected in the name of "conduct of a
business."-' Most commonly the interest to which that or similar language
has been applied is a course of dealing or prospective dealing with an identi-
fiable person or group,' 3 but the language of the opinions imposes no stricter
limitation on the interest protected than that it be one of business.
plied. "Special injury" is incurred by a variety of restraints and types of actions. Melvin
v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423 (App. D.C. 1942) (revocation of detective's license) ; Woodley v.
Coker, 119 Ga. 226,46 S.E. 89 (1903) (arrest under civil process) ; Barton v. Woodward,
32 Idaho 375, 182 Pac. 916 (1919) (lunacy proceeding) ; Coffey v. Myers, 84 Ind. App.
105 (1882) (bastardy action); Schierloh v. Kelly, 253 App. Div. 373, 2 N.Y.S.2d 12.3 (2d
Dep't 1938) (filing lis pendens) ; Sebring v. Van Aken, 235 App. Div. 420, 257 N.Y. Supp.
104 (4th Dep't 1932) (contempt proceeding) ; Louis J. Sigl, Inc. v. Bresnahan, 216 App.
Div. 634, 215 N.Y. Supp. 735 (4th Dep't 1928) (injunction); Sachs Y. Weinstein, 203
App. Div. 360, 203 N.Y. Supp. 449 (1st Dep't 1924) (involuntary petition in bankruptcy) ;
Brounstein v. Sahlein, 65 Hun 365, 20 N.Y. Supp. 213 (Sup. Ct. 1892) (replevin) ; Shaw
v. Moon, 117 Ore. 558, 245 Pac. 318 (1926) (issuing search warrant).
10. Accord, Supreme Lodge American Protective League v. Unverzagt, 76 Md. 104,
24 AUt. 323 (1892) ; Cincinnati Daily Tribune v. Bruck, 61 Ohio St. 4S9, 56 N.E. 193
(1900). Contra: Soffos v. Eaton, 152 F.2d 682 (App. D.C. 1945); American Optometric
Ass'n v. Ritholz, 101 F.2d 883 (C.CA. 7th 1939); cf. Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold
Mining Co. v. Eyre, 11 Q.B.D. 674 (C.A. 1883) ; Norm. v. Scheldt Mfg. Co, 297 Ill. 521,
130 N.E. 791 (1921).
11. Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187 (C.C.A. 2d 1943)
(inducement of employes to leave jobs) ; Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 NAV.. 946
(1909) (competing for sole purpose of destroying plaintiff's business) ; American Guild
of Musical Artists, Inc. v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E.2d 123 (1941) (threatening boy-
cott of association members) ; Opera On Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 34S, 34 N.E.2d
349 (1941) (ordering stagehands to refuse to serve plaintiff).
12. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U.S. 350
(1921) ; Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So.2d 383 (1943) ; Stein v. Schmitz,
21 N.J. Misc. 218, 32 A.2d 844 (Prerog. Ct. 1943) ; Ledwith v. International Paper Co,
64 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct 1946) ; Koral v. Savory, Inc., 163 Misc. 615, 5 N.Y.S.2d 270
(Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 856, 7 N.Y.S.2d 995 (2d Dep't 1938) ; Saxon Motor
Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Stebbins v. Ed-
wards, 101 Okla. 188, 224 Pac. 714 (1924) ; Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91 (1875).
13. In addition to cases cited note 11 .rtpra, see e.g., Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co'., 152
Iowa 618, 132 N.W. 371 (1911) (competition for sole purpose of destroying plaintiff's
business) ; Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 Atl. 109 (1935) (picketing to force em-
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With respect to the conduct condemned, as distinguished from the interest
allegedly damaged, the court was on less certain ground. In only one other
case found was a complaint alleging malicious bringing of a legal proceeding
upheld on a "wrongful interference" theory. 14 On the other hand, no contrary
authority has been located. And supporting the court are numerous dicta
which assert that whatever the pattern of conduct, the plaintiff can succeed, if
the defendant's conduct indicates that he acted "maliciously" or to inflict
"intentional harm" on the plaintiff, that his acts were "unjustifiable," and that
the result was injury to a business interest.',
In using the label "wrongful interference" the courts have apparently ap-
plied to the protection of business relations the rule which Holmes contended
was (or ought to be) a general principle of the common law: that "when a
responsible defendant seeks to escape from liability for an act which he had
notice was likely to cause temporal damage to another, and which has caused
such damage in fact, he must show a justification."' 6 A justification arises
when other considerations of public policy are stronger than the policy of
protecting business enterprise. Courts commonly regard as justified injuries
resulting from a labor union's pursuit of "legitimate" labor objectives or from
bona fide "fair" competition.
17
ployment of negroes) ; Wiliner v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341, 71 At. 962 (1909) (blacklist
of labor agitator); Wesley v. Native Lumber Co., 97 Miss. 814, 53 So. 346 (1910)
(threatening customers); Van Horn v. Van Horn, 56 N.J.L. 318, 28 Atl. 669 (1894) (in-
'ducing- suppliers to boycott plaintiff) ; Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co., Ltd. v.
Veitch [1942] A.C. 435 (same).
14. Stein v. Schmitz, 21 N.J. Misc. 218, 32 A.2d 844 (Prerog. Ct. 1943) ; cf. Koral v.
Savory, Inc., 168 Misc. 615, 5 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 856, 7
N.Y.S.2d 995 (2d Dep't 1938); see Virtue v. Creamery Pkg. Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17,
142 N.W. 930 (1913).
15. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926) ; Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S.
194, 204 (1904) ; Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187, 189
(C.C.A. 2d 1943) ; Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 106, 112, 143 N.W.
482, 485 (1913) ; Willner v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341, 356, 71 Ati. 962, 964 (1909) ; Plant
v, Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 498, 57 N.E. 1011, 1013 (1900) ; Canellos v. Zotalis, 145 Minn.
292, 296, 177 N.W. 133, 135 (1920) ; Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 89, 140 N.E. 203
205 (1923) ; Federal Waste Paper Corp. v. Garment Center Capitol, Inc., 268 App, Div.
230, 234, 51 N.Y.S2d 26, 29 (1st Dep't 1944) ; Coronado Development Corp. v. Milliken,
175 Misc. 1, 6, 22 N.Y.S.2d 670, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1940). But see Guethler v. Altman, 26 Ind,
App. 587, 590, 60 N.E. 355, 356 (1901) ; Auburn & Cato Plank Road Co. v. Douglass, 9
N.Y. 444, 455 (1854).
16. Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARv. L. Rzv. 1, 9 (1894).
17. Examples of alleged "wrongful interference" with another's business, "justified"
by competition: Lewviis v. Huie-Hodge Lumber Co., 121 La. 658, 46 So. 685 (1908) ; Bohn
Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N.W. 1119 (1893); Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y.
80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923) ; Macauley v. Tierney, 19 R.I. 255, 33 At. 1 (1895) ; Roblson v.
Texas Pine Land Ass'n, 40 S.W. 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) ; Hawarden v. Youghiogheny
& L. Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901) ; Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow &
Co., [1892] A.C. 25; "justified" by a bona fide labor dispute: Truax v. Bisbee Local, 19
Ariz. 379, 171 Pac. 121 (1918) ; Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.EM 63
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Application of the rule requiring compensation for harm intentionally done
seems especially desirable in the field of business relations. Courses and
customs of dealing, reputation and credit standing are genuine business assets,
often more valuable to an entrepreneur than physical plant; the protection of
such intangibles would appear essential to a system which aims at distributing
wealth on a basis of rewarding the enterprising. The variety of forms which
such assets may take and the infinite possibilities for unjustified interference
with them require that the doctrinal basis for their protection remain flexible.
Yet this very flexibility presents opportunity for the tailoring of cases
which may be nothing more than claims insufficient under one of the tradi-
tional tort theories to fit the language of "wrongful interference." Although
the court in 3unson Line v. Green did not explicitly consider whether any
policy reflected in the conditions to the maintenance of an action for malicious
prosecution would be subverted by upholding the complaint, it is evident that
the decision was made in the conviction that something more was alleged than
is to be found in a malicious prosecution suit.
The asserted reason that courts in about half the states impose onerous
conditions on actions for malicious prosecution is that a contrary rule might
deter sincere resort to the courts.1 s Potential litigants might be discouraged
if they knew that successful defendants could subject them to counterclaims
for malicious prosecution. The conduct alleged in Mienson Line v. Green, it
would seem, went far beyond the probable actions of the most assiduous pro-
tector of his rights, and thus beyond the protection required to effectuate this
policy of unobstructed access to the court. In this particular case, then, the
"court's conclusion that it was more than a dressed-up, deceptively labelled suit
for malicious prosecution seems justified.
The decision suggests, however, other possibilities for use of a "wrongful
interference" theory. Applied to a set of facts of the sort ordinarily alleged in
an action for defamation, the theory might deceive an ingenuous judge or
tempt a discerning one to circumvent the accepted prerequisites or defenses.10
(1932) ; LaFrAnce Elect. Const. & Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood Elect. WVorh-
ers, 108 Ohio St. 61, 140 N.E. 899 (1923) ; Allen v. Flood [1893] A.C. 1. See Hellerstein,
Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 Ym.z L. J. 341 (1938). On the other hand,
competition or a labor dispute is considered an inadequate "justification' for certain types
of conduct. See cases cited note 4supra, and Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429,
41 S.E. 553 (1902); Purington v. Hinchcliff, 219 Ill. 159, 76 N.E. 47 (1905); Plant v.
Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900) ; Virtue v. Creamery Pkg. Mfg. Co., 123
Minn. 17, 142 N.W. 930 (1913) ; Federal Waste Paper Co. v. Garment Center Capitol,
Inc., 268 App. Div. 230, 51 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
18. See Paul v. Fargo, 84 App. Div. 9, 18, 82 N.Y. Supp. 369, 375 (4th Dep't 1903);
Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 426 (App. D.C. 1942). In England an award of costs is
said to be sufficient compensation for the victim of a malicious civil action, Quartz Hill
Consolidated Gold Mfining Co. v. Eyre, 11 Q.B.D. 674, 690 (CA. 183) ; but in this coun-
try costs are recognized as inadequate compensation, Paul v. Fargo, stipra.
19. The successful use of this theory to get around requirements of other torts is
especially likely where the policy behind the requirements is obscure or obsolete. The
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The assault on the flanks has already started; two recent decisions"° have em-
ployed "wrongful interference" or similar language to defeat the doctrine that
"special damage" is a necessary element of "trade libel."'- Although that
requirement is usually satisfied only by pleading loss of particular customers
or sales, 22 plaintiffs succeeded under the "interference" label with most gen-
eral allegations of injury to business or reputation from disparagement of
property. Similarly vulnerable is the slander doctrine, calling for "special
damage" when the defamatory utterance, though not imputing traits incon-
sistent with able business conduct, injures the plaintiff's trade.23 "Wrongful
requirement of "special damages" in most slander cases is a good example. Sfie reference
to this rule in PROSsER, TORTS 808 (1941) : "Nothing but historical survival of the relics
of forgotten jurisdictional conflicts accounts for a state of affairs peculiar to the common
law, and unknown elsewhere in the civilized world."
In another branch of torts, analogous attempts have been made to avoid the defenses
of contributory negligence or governmental immunity by labelling the cause of action
"nuisance." E.g., McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928) ; Hub-
bard v. Wichita, 98 Kan. 498, 159 Pac. 399 (1916).
20. In Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401
(1946) the complaint alleged that the defendant, sponsor of the "Hit Parade," consist-
ently gave songs published by the plaintiff a lower ranking than was due them, and that as
a result "exploitation" of the songs was "frustrated," their value depreciated, plaintiff's
revenue diminished, and its "property right" and business prestige impaired. A "trade
libel" theory had been unsuccessful in a lower court, 268 App. Div. 707, 53 N.Y.S.2d 337
(1st Dep't 1945). In Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So.2d 383 (1943) de-
fendant allegedly parked a Hudson car with a large white elephant on it near plaintiff's
Hudson salesroom. As a result plaintiff's business was "irreparably harmed." Cf. Para-
mount Pictures Inc. v. Leader Press, 106 F.2d 229 (C.C.A. 10th 1939). Early cases indi-
cate that "trade libel," in combination with other wrongs, is actionable as "wrongful inter-
ference." Leach v. Farmers' Tobacco Warehouse Co., 171 Ky. 791, 188 S.W. 886 (1916) ;
Virtue v. Creamery Pkg. Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17, 142 N.W. 930 (1913); Stebbins v.
Edwards, 101 Okla. 188, 224 Pac. 714 (1924).
21. The doctrine is that "special damages" are those which follow naturally, but not
necessarily, from defendant's utterance. For a full discussion and collection of cases, see
Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 CoL. L. Rnv. 13, 121 (1913).
22. Stevenson v. Love, 106 Fed. 466 (C.C.N.J. 1901) ; Ebersole v. Fields, 181 Ala.
421, 62 So. 73 (1913) ; Dooling v. Budget Publishing Co., 144 Mass. 258, 10 N.E. 809
(1887) ; Wilson v. Dubois, 35 Minn. 271, 29 N.W. 68 (1886) ; Hubbard v. Scott, 85 Ore,
1, 166 Pac. 33 (1917) ; Denney v. Northwestern Credit Ass'n, 55 Wash. 331, 104 Pac.
769 (1909) ; Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164, 201 Pac. 352 (1921). A minority of
cases sustain general allegations of loss of sales "in exceptional cases." The plaintiff
must aver the amount of sales before publication, the amount of sales after publication,
and that it was impossible for him to allege the names of particular customers who wVith-
drew their business. Erich Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbury Laboratories, 17
F.2d 255 (C.C.A. 8th 1926) ; Ratcliffe v. Evans [1892] 2 Q. B. 524 (C.A.).
23. E.g., Weidberg v. LaGuardia, 170 Misc. 374, 10 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
("bum in a gin mill") ; Ayre v. Craven, 2 Ad. & El. 2, 111 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B. 1834)
(adultery) ; Lumby v. Allday, 1 C. & J. 301, 148 Eng. Rep. 1434 (Ex. 1831) (consorting
with a prositute); RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 573 (1938). Compare Riding v. Smith, 1
Ex. D. 91 (1876), in which a verdict -was obtained for "wrongful interference" with
plaintiff's business as a result of utterances imputing adultery to his wife.
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interference" might also assist in avoiding a Statute of Limitations applicable
to defamation only,2 4 the defense of truthns the absolute privilege of wit-
nesses2 6 and counsel3 in judicial proceedings, or the requirement that defama-
tory language be set out in the complaint.2 8 The theory is especially promising
where, as in Munson Line v. Grcen, the interfering defamation is repeated, or
is combined with other injurious conduct not in itself actionable.
DEBT CANCELLATION AND TAX BASIS REDUCTION IN
CHAPTER X REORGANIZATION*
The scaling down of debt to a level which will free the corporation of a
heavy burden of fixed charges is a goal of every reorganization under Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act.' Impeding attempts to reach that goal is the rule
that taxable income may result from cancellation of indebtedness. Sanctioned
fifteen years ago by the Supreme Court in Uvited States v. Kirby Lumber
Company,2 the rule has since been unsystematically fashioned by the courts
24. Cf. Ledwith v. International Paper Co., 64 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1946) in
which the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss an action filed after the one-year
libel Statute of Limitations had run, characterizing the cause of action as one for "dam-
age wilfully and intentionally done," to which a longer limitation applied. The complaint
alleged that defendant brought about plaintiff's "disgrace, contempt, and ruin" by firing
him and notifying the trade of the discharge on the pretense that plaintiff's work had
deteriorated.
25. RESTATEmENT, ToaTs § 582 (1938) : "The truth of a defamatory statement of fact
is a complete defense to an action for defamation." This rule is followed in all but a few
states 'which have changed it by statute. Cases and statutes are collected in Ray, Truth:
A Defense it Libel, 16 Mixe. L. Rav. 43 (1931). The tort of "invasion of the right of
privacy" has been useful in evading the rule in many cases. Volff, Unfair Compelition
by Truthful Disparagement, 47 YALE L. J. 1304, 1303-9 (1938). For a discussion ques-
tioning the validity of the rule as applied in business relations, see Wolff, supra. The
defense of truth and the privileges of parties to judicial proceeaings are recognized in
actions for trade libel and slander of title. RESTATEmENTr, ToTs §§ 634-9 (1933).
26. Material statements made in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged and
cannot successfully be made the subject of actions for libel or slander. Laing v. Mitten,
185 Mass. 233, 70 N.E. 128 (1904) ; Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179, 14 At. 50D (18) ;
Cooley v. Galyon, 109 Tenn. 1, 70 S.,V. 607 (1902); REsTATEMEN.T, Tos § 598 (1938).
27. Carpenter v. Ashley, 148 Cal. 422, 83 Pac. 444 (1906) ; McDavitt v. Boyer, 169
IIl. 475, 48 N.E. 317 (1897); Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P2d 1127 (1938); RE-
sTATEmENT, Toms § 586 (1938).
28. Carroll v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 20 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Locl:e v.
Benton & Bowles, Inc., 253 App. Div. 369, 2 N.Y.S2d 150 (1st Dep't 1938); Al Raschid
v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934).
* Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122 (C.C.A.
1st 1946). No petition for certiorari filed, 5 P-H 1946 Fan. TA.J Stav. ff 71,117.
1. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1940).
2. 284 U.S. 1 (1931). The Treasury had adopted the rule in its regulations as
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and Congress to meet the conflicting needs of revenue and of debtor's relief.
To an increasing extent the courts have attempted to mitigate the harshness
of the Kirby doctrine as applied to financially embarrassed debtors. One of
the judicially-devised exceptions relates to a debtor corporation which is per-
mitted to issue stock in exchange for its outstanding bonds.8 According to
the Tax Court this amounts to "continuation of the obligation in another
form" .4 according to the latest pronouncement of the First Circuit it is "pay-
ment."5 Under either theory no taxable income has been found to arise out
of the exchange.
Congressional action in lightening the debtor's tax load under the Kirby
rule has both supplemented and duplicated that of the courts. When Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 19386 it was provided in Section
early as 1921. U.S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art. 545 (1) (c) under Revenue Act of 1921. For
discussion of the Kirby case, see MAGrui, TAxALE INcomE 241 et seq. (rev. ed. 1945).
The Kirby rule is an inducement to trustees and reorganizing corporations to keep the
proportion of bonds to stock as high as the requirement that the plan of reorganization
be "feasible" permits.
3. Commissioner v. Capento Securities Corp., 140 F.2d 382 (C.C.A. 1st 1944);
Alcazar Hotel Inc. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 872 (1943). Four other principal excep-
tions exist, where (1) The debtor remains insolvent after the cancellation. Dallas Transfer
& Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95 (C.C.A. 5th 1934); Texas Gas
Distributing Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 57 (1944). But a debtor ingolvent before the
cancellation receives taxable income to the extent that his assets exceed his liabilities
after the cancellation. Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 283 (C.C.A. 5th 1941).
(2) The cancellation is a reduction in a purchase price. Commissioner v. Sherman, 135
F.2d 68 (C.C.A. 6th 1943) ; Allen v. Courts, 127 F.2d 127 (C.C.A. 5th 1942) ; Helver-
ing v. A. L. Killian Co., 128 F.2d 433 (C.C.A. 8th 1942); Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115
F.2d 656 (C.C.A. 7th 1940). (3) The cancellation is a gift. Helvering v. American Dental
Co., 318 U. S. 322 (1943). (4) A stockholder forgives a debt owed him by the corpora-
tion in which he owns stock. Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., 74 F.2d 226
(C.C.A. 2d 1934). For a general treatment of the taxation of Chapter*X reorganizations
and of the application of the Kirby rule, see 6 COLL=E, BANxawRU §§ 15:10-15:12 (14th
ed. 1947).
4. Motor Mart Trust v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 931 (1945) ; Alcazar Hotel, Inc, v.
Commissioner, 1 T.C. 872, 879 (1943); Capento Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 47
B.T.A. 691 (1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 382 (C.C.A. 1st 1944).
5. Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122 (C.C.A. 1st 1946).
6. "Sec. 268. Except as provided in section 270 of this Act, no income or profit
taxable under any law of the United States or of any State now in force or which may
hereafter be enacted, shall, in respect to the adjustment of the indebtedness of a debtor
in a proceeding under this chapter, be deemed to have accrued to or to have been realized
by a debtor, by a trustee provided for in a plan under this chapter, or by a corporation
organized or made use of for effectuating a plan under this chapter by reason of a mod-
ificatlion it or cmcelation in whole or in part of any of the indebtedness of the debtor
in a proceeding under this chapter." 52 STAT. 904 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 668 (1940) (italics
added).
Other statutory exceptions to the Kirby rule were included in the Bankruptcy Act
of 1938: §§ 395 and 396, 52 STAT. 915 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 795-6 (1940), applied to
Chapter XI Arrangements provisions for nonrecognition of cancellation of indebtedness
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268 that no income shall be deemed to have accrued by reason of a "modifica-
tion or cancellation" of indebtedness in a Chapter X reorganization except as
required by Section 270. Under Section 2707 the debtor must reduce the tax
basis of its property by the amount of any "cancellation or reduction,"8 but
not to a figure less than the fair market value of the property as of the date
the plan is confirmed Since reduction of the basis lowers allowable deduc-
tions for depreciation'0 and either increases capital gains or decreases capital
losses on sale of the property," Section 270 results in raising the reorganized
corporation's taxable income in subsequent years. In effect it thus requires the
debtor-where future operations are profitable-eventually to make up for
the taxes forgiven by Section 26832
and for basis reduction similar to §§ 263 and 270; §§ 520 and 522, 52 SrAr. 929 (1938),
11 U.S.C. § 920, 922 (1940), made similar provisions with respect to Chapter XII Real
Property Arrangements; § 679, 52 ST.T. 938 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1079 (1940), provided
for nonrecognition of cancellations in Chapter XIII Wage Earners' Plans, but no basis,
reduction requirement was included. INT. REv. CoDE §§ 22 (b) (9), 113 (b) (3), permit
a corporation receiving a taxable cancellation of indebtedness outside of a bankruptcy
reorganization to exclude the amount of the cancellation from taxable income, if it elects
to be subject to a corresponding basis reduction. IN.r. REv. CODE § 22 (b) (10), provides
for nonrecognition of cancellations in railroad reorganization or receivership proceedings.
7. "Sec. 270. In determining the basis of property for any purposes of any law
of the United States or of a State imposing a tax upon income, the basis of the debtor's
property (other than money) or of such property (othir than money) as is transferred
to any person required to use the debtor's basis in whole or in part shall be decreased
by an amount equal to the amount by which the indebtedness of the debtor, not including
accrued interest unpaid and not resulting in a tax benefit on any income tax return, has
been cawceled or reduced in a proceeding under this chapter, but the basis of any par-
ticular property shall not be reduced to an amount less than the fair market value of
such property as of the date of entry of the order confirming the plan. . . ." 52 STAT.
904 (1938), as amended, 54 STAT. 709, 11 U.S.C. § 670 (1940) (italics added).
& Roughly, the basis reduction is accomplished by reducing the basis of each unit
of the debtor's property according to the following proportion:
old basis of unit
old basis of unit- (total debt reduction X old b ofall new basis of unit.
corporate property)
For detailed instructions see U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, Art. 29. 113 (b) (1)-2.
9. The fair market value limitation vas added by amendment in 1940. 54 STAT.
709, 11 U.S.C. § 670 (1940).
10. Deductions for depreciation are limited to "a reasonable allowance for the ex-
haustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)" of the
corporation's property. IxT. REv. CODE § 23 (1). See also U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §
29.23 (1)-1: .... The proper allowance for such depreciation is that amount which
should be set aside for the taxable year in accordance with a reasonably consistent plan
(not necessarily at a uniform rate) whereby the aggregate of the amounts so set aside
plus the salvage value, will, at the end of the useful life of the depreciable property, equal
the cost or other basis of the property."
11. See Ixr. REv. CODE § 111.
12. The full amount of taxes forgiven would probably not be made up by basis re-
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The troublesome question is whether Section 270 does more than take back
the gift granted by Section 268: whether it also requires reduction of the
debtor's basis even where, without Section 268, the debtor would not have
taxable income from the extinguishment of debt,13 as when the debt extine-
tion falls within an exception to the Kirby rule. Section 270 is not expressly
limited in application to debtor corporations which would have income to re-
port but for Section 268. Therefore, the possibility was created that the
fruits of the judicially-devised exceptions might not be retained by debtors
reorganizing under Chapter X.
The first appellate court to rule on this point, the Seventh Circuit, held that
Section 270 controlled and that the debtor's basis must be reduced.14 The ques-
tion was again presented to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Motor Mart Trust."a In 1937
Motor Mart, a Massachusetts trust taxable as a corporation, initiated a reor-
ganization proceeding under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act.10 As the
proceeding continued through 1938, Sections 268 and 270 were held to
apply.'7 The old shareholders were excluded and the bondholders were given
duction, because of the graduated tax rates. Assume, for example, that the debt cancellation
amounted to $1,000,000. If the whole amount were taxed in one year, the maximum rate
would be applied to the entire amount. If, because of basis reduction, the corporation
had $25,000 additional income for each of forty subsequent years instead of $1,000,000 in
one year, and its income without the basis reduction would have been $10,000 (making
a total of $35,000 a year), none of its income would be taxed at the maximum rate. On
the other hand, if the corporate income other than that attributable to basis reduction
exceeded $25,000 in every one of the ten years, the whole $1,000,000 would be taxed at
the maximum rate. See 55 STAT. 692 (1941), 59 STAT. 568 (1945), 26 U.S.C. §§ 13, 15
(Supp. 1946).
Furthermore, the corporation is forced to gamble on future tax rates by taking the
basis reduction-if the tax rates go up, it will probably pay more taxes than it would
have paid had the tax been levied on the whole of the cancellation in the year of re-
orgattization; if the rates go down, the corporation will pay less.
In every case where the basis reduction is substituted for an immediate tax the
corparation will, of course, have the advantage of having available for inVestment, until
the total tax abatement is made up, funds which otherwise would have had to be paid
in taxes in the reorganization year.
13. For other discussions of this question see Paul, Debt atd Basis Reduction under
the Chandler Act, 15 TuLA-NE L. Rzv. 1, 5 (1940) ; Banks, Section 270 of the National
Bankruptcy Act, 19 TEmp. L. Q. 31, 42 (1945) ; Comment, 6 U. oF Cut. L. Rav. 447, 455
(1939).
14. Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 962 (1943), rev'd on other
grounds, 323 U.S. 141 (1944). The court argued that Congress, "dealing with realities,"
vanted to eliminate the "fictitious depredation basis" when the reorganization valuation
of the property was much less than the basis, 138 F.2d at 965.
15. 156 F.2d 122 (1946).
16. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), superseded by Chapter X, 52 STAT. 840, 883 (1938), 11
U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1940).
17. The plan was confirmed June 21, 1938, and a final decree was entered early in
1939. The First Circuit followed the dictum of the Supreme Court in Claridge Apart-
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new common and preferred shares of a total par value of $500,000 in ex-
change for outstanding bonds and accrued interest totalling $1,900,000. When
the reorganized Trust continued to use the original cost of its fixed assets as
a basis for depreciation, the Commissioner, claiming that the basis should be
reduced to the fair market value of the property in accordance with Section
270, asserted deficiencies in the Trust's income tax for 1939 and 1940. The
appellate court confirmed the Tax Court's decision that Section 270 does not
apply to an exchange of stocks for bonds. Relying on its earlier holding in
Commissioner v. Capento Securities Corporation'8 that an exchange of stock
for bonds is not a taxable concellation of indebtedness within the Kirby rule, the
court reasoned that the Trust received no tax advantage from Section 268.
Applying Section 270 would have meant increased taxes; but Congress, ac-
cording to Supreme Court dictum, intended Sections 268 and 270 as tax-re-
lief measures.' 9 Therefore, the court decided that implementing the Congres-
sional intent required its decision that the exchange wnas a "payment" and not
a "cancellation or reduction" of debt within the meaning of Section 270,23
and held that the Trust could continue to use its old basis. The court conceded
that Section 270 might apply in some situations where no benefit was received
from Section 268, but argued that doubtful phrases should be construed to
carry out the Congressional intent.
Although the court correctly found a Congressional intent to grant tax re-
lief to debtors availing themselves of Chapter X, it was not drawing an in-
evitable conclusion when it determined that this particular case should be
ments Company v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141 (1944), in which § 276 (c), 52 STAT. 905
(1938), 11 U.S.C. § 676 (c) (1940) was construed to make §§ 268 and 270 apply to 77B
proceedings pending on Sept. 22, 1938.
18. 140 F.2d 382 (C.C.A. 1st 1944). In that case bonds of the Raytheon Production
Corporation were given up by Capento in exchange for preferred stock. Both Production
and Capento were wholly-owned subsidiaries of Raytheon Manufacturing Corporation.
The transaction was carried out at the request of a bank which refused to make a loan
to Production while the bonds were outstanding. The court adopted, with long quotation,
the Tax Court's conclusion that capital stock liability was substituted for the bonded in-
debtedness. Id. at 386.
19. "... in its brief the Government asserts... 'This contention, although plaus-
ible, neglects the fact that Sections 268 and 270 are essctially tax prisions.... To
this it may be answered that the sections, in origin, purpose, and function were 'essen-
tially reorganiz tion provisions' or to put it differently, 'essentially tax relief provisions."
Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141, 163 n.35 (1944). See also:
"The general purpose of the provisions . was to postpone the tax consequences which
otherwise might ensue upon transactions occurring in such circumstances that imnedi-
ate imposition was regarded as economically unjustifiable." Id. at 147.
20. The First Circuit's shift in rationale, from declaring the exchange to be a con-
tinuance of the obligation in the Capento case, to describing it as "payment" in the
Motor Mart case, was unnecessary to the result. Nor does the newer rationale seem
more satisfactory. "Payment" may be made, but if less is paid than originally contemplated,
there would seem to be a taxable accretion within the Kirby rule. Adequacy of payment,
undiscussed by the court, rather than the fact of payment represents the real issue.
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decided, if possible, so as to ease the taxpayer's burden. Had the court taken
an appropriate selection of material from the Congressional reports, it could
have shown that Congress, on the advice of the Treasury, rejected a proposal
specifically designed to make Section 270 recapture only the amount of income
which would have been taxable but for Section 268.21 In addition, the Su-
preme Court had indicated that Congress intended to do away with the un-
certainty prevailing in the taxation of bankruptcy reorganizations. 22 That
purpose would embrace wiping the slate clean of the Kirby rule and its
exceptions as applied to reorganizations. A decision for the taxpayer in the
Motor Mart case preserves one of those exceptions, tending to give new life
to the uncertainty which Congress desired to eliminate.
Finally, it could be contended that Sections 268 and 270 represent a fitting
of the basis provisions governing reorganized corporations into the frame-
work of the Internal Revenue Code basis provisions. With few exceptions,
the basis of an asset is its cost.21 To the extent that debt incurred to pur-
chase a particular asset is cancelled or exchanged for property worth less
than the amount of the debt, in effect the cost of that asset is reduced. Treated
as a reduction in purchase price, the debt cancellation would not be taxed,24
but consistency would require modifying the basis to reflect the actual cost.
Failure so to modify the basis would result in income escaping taxation, as
the corporation could deduct as depreciation more than it paid for the prop-
erty. There would, it could be argued, be nothing unreasonable about finding
such a Congressional purpose. After a Chapter X reorganization a corpora-
21. This was the proposal of the National Bankruptcy Conference. What happened
to the proposal in Congress is set forth in a letter from Representative Chandler to
J. B. Faegre, Minneapolis attorney: "The story is too long to tell in a letter, but the
cause of the trouble can be traced to the Treasury Department, which promised to sub-
mit an equitable paragraph to be inserted in the bill in lieu of sections 270 et al., but
failed to do so after the bill reached the Senate floor in 1938. Therefore the language in
the sections referred to is not the language which I preferred, but Senator O'Mahoney
and I had to accept the language rather than let the bill fail of passage because of the
shortness of time." Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 9864, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 58 (1940). In 1940 the proposal' was aired at length
in the hearings on the amendment to Section 270 (see note 9 supra) which was not adopted,
A possible reason for its rejection was suggested by Representative Michener: "We can-
not start by the piecemeal method in these items to readjust the inequalities in connection
with revenue and reduce revenues, if we are going to meet the necessary financial de-
mands on the Government right now." Id. at 8. A Treasury representative opposed the
amendment on the ground that it would create insuperable administrative difficulties.
Id. at 62.
22. "It [Section 268] had no other object and there was no other reason for its
being, than to free Chapter X reorganizations from the tax deterrents, including tax
uncertainties, imposed by the existing revenue provisions." Claridge Apartments Co. v.
Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141, 149 (1944).
23. For the general rule and a list of exceptions, see INT. REv. CoDn § 113 (a).
24. Allen v. Courts, 127 F.2d 127 (C.C.A. 5th 1942); Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115
F.2d 656 (C.C.A. 7th 1940).
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tion is essentially a new organization; its old obligations are largely forgiven,
its old owners displaced. In the general housecleaning, the overstated basis
might be replaced by one reflecting current property values, just as a new
corporation would have to use a basis of cost, which presumably would be
related to current values.
The result the court reached, however, carries out the Bankruptcy Act
policy of treating reorganizations alike, whatever form they take-' Where
stock is exchanged for bonds in non-bankruptcy reorganizations, under the
Capewto rule there is no taxable income and nothing in the Internal Revenue
Code to force reduction of the old basis. If the court had construed Section
270 to require a basis reduction where the same exchange took place in a
Chapter X recapitalization, a corporation would have a strong incentive to
attempt an extra-bankruptcy reorganization even though the resulting finan-
cial structure might be weaker than if the corporation took advantage of
Chapter X. Furthermore, since 1943 Chapter X recapitalizations would have
been at a disadvantage in comparison with Chapter X reorganizations in-
volving the transfer of assets to a new corporation, for Section 113 (a) (22)
of the Internal Revenue Code, adopted in that year, expressly preserves "not-
withstanding the provisions of Section 270" the debtor's old basis on property
so transferred.28 The Motor Mart decision, by allowing a recapitalized cor-
poration to retain its old basis, avoids this possibility of tax discrimination
between forms of reorganization.
Nor was the other policy consideration present, the taxing of income how-
ever it arises, sacrificed by the court. Although there was a paper increment
on the books of the Trust, the owners of the Trust received no income in
the sense of resources available for dividends or for use in the business. By
the time the reorganization proceeding began the interest of the stockholders
had been dissipated, and, in all but form, the bondholders had the only bene-
ficial interest. The reorganization merely recast the form to correspond to
the substance.2
25. The development of the reorganization plan should not "be prejudiced by the
injection of altogether extraneous considerations, that is, tax consequences." S=,. REP.
No. 1857, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940). For a general statement of the problems and
purposes of corporate reorganization see 6 CoLnnm, BANamtuwpc 2 (14th ed. 1947).
26. 58 STAT. 42 (1944). The House version of the 1943 Revenue Bill contained no
section corresponding to § 113 (a) (22). The Senate bill included the present § 113
(a) (22) and a provision that a corporation reorganized by the adjustment of capital and
debt structure of the existing corporation should be deemed to be a new corporation or-
ganized to effectuate the plan of reorganization. SEN. REP. No. 627, 78 Cong., 1st Sess.
51 (1943). The conference committee eliminated the latter provision without explana-
tion.
27. The Motor Mart case is thus distinguishable from the Kirby case. In that case
a going concern purchased its own bonds on the open market at less than their face
value. The original stockholders remained in control. The purchase made available for
other use company resources which would have been needed to pay off the bonds at their
face value.
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The Motor Mart case, together with Section 113(a) (22) of the Internal
Revenue! Code, reduces the applicability of Section 270 to a small fraction of
Chapter X reorganizations. There will be left within that section only those
rare reorganizations in which the old corporate form is retained and the debt
is reduced by means other than an exchange of stock for bonds. For example,
the section might apply to a reorganization which incorporated an agreement
by creditors voluntarily to reduce their claims.28 Although in such case a claim
for tax exemption with respect to the cancellation of indebtedness could
be based on the doctrine that gratuitous cancellation of indebtedness is a
"gift" as well as on Section 268, the Treasury might insist on a basis re-
duction according to Section 270.30 The rationale of the Motor Mart opinion
suggests that the First Circuit would try to avoid applying Section 270; yet
doubt is -cast by the court's admission that "it is possible that the reduction
in basis required by section 270 is not entirely limited to cases where dis-
charges of debt would have given rise to taxable gain but for the saving
provision of Section 268."31 Thus, with tax consequences uncertain, corpo-
rations will try to obtain agreement with creditors to carry out a reorganiza-
tion outside the bankruptcy courts, or, until the Supreme Court or Congress
settles the Motor Mart issue,3 2 bankruptcy trustees and courts will go through
the added motion of transferring assets to new corporatipns so as to take
advantage of Section 113 (a) (22).
GROSS RECEIPTS TAXES: A CHANGE IN DOCTRINE"
In the late thirties the United States Supreme Court evolved a new consti-
tutional test for state taxes on gross, receipts from interstate commerce.1
Traditionally a tax had fallen when its, effect on interstate commerce was held
28. Example suggested in Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Harold Wur-
zel, New York attorney, Nov. 4, 1946.
29. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
30. The Treasury Regulation is couched in the language of § 270: "... a further
adjustment is required in certain cases in which there has been a cancellation or reduc-
tion of indebtedness in a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act, as amended." 'U.S. Treas.
Reg. 111, Art. 29.113(b) (1)-2.
31. Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122, 126 (1946).
32. One can only speculate as to why the Government did not petition for certiorari from
the Motor Mart decision. Perhaps it wai felt that, since the trustees had relied upotl an
earlier opinion of the Commissioner given at their request, the equities were on the side
of the taxpayer. Id. at 124.
* Freeman v. Hewit, 67 Sup. Ct. 274 (1946) ; Interriational Harvester Co, v. Evatt,
67 Sup. Ct. 444 (1947) ; Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 815
(1947).
1. The cases that heralded the change are discussed infra. See also Jqhnson, Multi.
State Taxation of Interstate Sales, 27 CALiF. L. Rav. 549 (1939) ; Lockhart, State Tax
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to be "direct" and had stood when the effect was only "indirect."3 Under the
newer doctrine the commerce clause seemed to permit gross receipts taxes if
they were either (1) apportioned to intrastate activities or (2) incapable of
duplication by any other state.4 Implicit in the change was a promise to meas-
ure taxes by economic effect rather than by correspondence to verbal cate-
gories. The promise was soon qualified, and three decisions in the present
term indicate that the Court may be forsaking the economic tests altogether.
The first of these cases, Freeman v. He'it,5 disposed of an attempted ap-
plication of the Indiana Gross Income Tax without considering the possibility
of multiple tax burdens or lack of apportionment. The tax-payer, a resident
of Indiana, had sold securities on the New York Stock Exchange, the transac-
tions being handled by a local broker through his New York correspondent.
On the gross receipts thereof, which had already borne the New York Stock
Transfer Tax, Indiana imposed its 1% levy. The Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter for himself and four other justices, invalidated the tax as
a "direct imposition on that very Freedom of commercial flow which for
more than a hundred and fifty years has been the ward of the Commerce
Clause."6 Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred in the result,' but declared that to
stand on such a ground meant a repudiation of the recently developed prag-
matic approach and a return to once rejected doctrine. The inference to be
drawn from the language of the majority opinion was that neither apportion-
ment to intrastate activities nor the impossibility of multiple taxation would
save a tax if it were "directly" imposed on gross receipts from interstate
transactions.
Before 1938 the rule was recognized that any tax on gross receipts from in-
terstate commerce was a direct burden on that commerce and thus forbidden
by the Constitution.8 But in reality states could and did tax gross receipts.
Barriers to Interstate Trade, 53 HAzv. L. REv. 1253 (1940); Lockhart, Gross Receipts
Taxes on Interstate Transportation and Communication, 57 HAnv. L RLv. 40 (1943);
Morrison, State Taxation of Interstate Coimmerce, 36 ILL. L. REv. 727 (1942) ; Traynor,
State Taxation md the Commerce Clause, 28 CALIw. L. REV. 163 (1940).
2. New Jersey Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338 (1930); Crew Levick
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917); Philadelphia & Southern S.S. Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
3. American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919); Ficklen v.
Shelby County Tadng District, 145 U.S. 1 (1892); Morrison, mspra note 1, at 729; cf.
U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
4. See note 1 supra.
5. 67 Sup. Ct 274 (1946) ; Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transac-
tions, 47 CoT. L. Rzv. 211 (1947).
6. Freeman v. Hewit, 67 Sup. Ct. 274, 278 (1946).
7. Mr. Justice Black dissented without opinion. Air. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr.
Justice Murphy, dissented with an opinion in which he maintained that since the tax was
borne by a casual seller, and not an agency engaged in interstate commerce, there %as no
burden on commerce.
,8. Powell, State Income Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 31 YAIm L J. 799 (1922).
It is interesting to note that in The Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 NVail. 232 (U.S.
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This apparent contradiction resulted from the Court's recognition of a dif-
ference between a tax -"on" gross receipts and a tax "measured by" gross
receipts. A tax "on" property,9 or use, 10 or manufacturing,"1 "measured by"
gross receipts was considered to be on a local activity with only a remote or
indirect effect on interstate commerce. The legislative description seemed
more determinative than economic effect.
The dominance of this formalistic approach was challenged in Western
Live Stock v. Burean of Revenue,'2 where the Court upheld a tax imposed on
the gross receipts from sales of advertising space by a magazine with an in-
terstate circulation. Mr. Justice Stone, for the majority, stated that the tax
was really on the local operation of the business and did not conflict with the
commerce clause. This was the traditional rationale. But he gave an "added
reason."'13 There was, he said, no possibility of another state imposing a
similar tax, and, further, gross receipts taxes had been invalidated in the past
only when capable of duplication by other states and not fairly apportioned to
local activities. It is arguable that Mr. Justice Stone was wrong on both
counts. As a practical matter, a sales tax in an outside state would have sub-
jected the publisher in the Western Live Stock case to a tax additional to
those borne by a wholly local publication. And the interpretation of past
decisions is contradicted by some of the cases cited to support it.14
But whatever the basis for the "added reason" at its inception, it was fur-
ther developed in Adams Manufqcturing Co. v. Storenlr and Gwin, White
1872), where the prohibition against state taxes on gross receipts from interstate com-
merce got its start, one of the reasons given was the possibility of multiple tax burdens.
The reason was forgotten, though the rule remained. Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on
Interstate Transportation and Communication, 57 HARv. L. Rav. 40, 67 (1943) ; Morrison,
supra note 1, at 732.
9. Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U.S. 330 (1923) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minne-
sota, 246 U.S. 450 (1918); U.S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335 (1912); Wis-
consin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379 (1903) ; New York, L. E. & W. R. R. v.
Pennsylvania, 158 U.S. 431 (1895).
10. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
11. American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
12. 303 U.S. 250 (1938), 86 U. PA. L. Ry. 787, 24 VA. L. Ray. 809.
13. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 260 (1938),
14. Two cases, for example, cited for the proposition that state taxes were invalidated
only when they could be duplicated by other states, involved wholly intrastate businesses,
and the possibility of multiple taxation was very slim. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas,
210 U. S. 217 (1908) (intrastate railroad); Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax
Comm., 297 U. S. 650 (1936) (intrastate radio station). In connection with the latter
case, Mr. Justice Stone said "if broadcasting could be taxed so also could reception," and
referred to a British tax on radio receivers. Such a tax seems no more probable or
burdensome than a sales tax on magazines or even a gross receipts tax levied by a state
where the magazines are sold. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250,
260 and n. 2 (1938). Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transportation atd
Commtnication, 57 HARV. L. Ray. 40, 71 (1943).
15. 304 U. S. 307 (1938), 4 Mo. L. Ray. 64 (1939).
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and Prince v. Henne-ford.16 Both cases involved taxes on gross receipts
derived in large part from sales outside the taxing state. The Court declared
both taxes invalid because not apportioned to intrastate activities, and because,
if sustained, they could be duplicated by other states touched by the sales.
These decisions required that an earlier holding, American Manufacturing
Co. v. St. Lozds,17 be distinguished or overruled. In that case a gross receipts
tax had been sustained because it was nominally on manufacturing, though
measured by the gross proceeds from sales both in and out of the taxing state.
The Court accepted this verbalism as a valid ground for distinction; the
Anwrican Manufacturing case therefore did not control the Adams and Gwin
cases where the taxes were "on!' gross receipts.2s
Despite the refusal to overrule Amcrican Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis,
the pragmatic approach developed in the above cases seemed to justify a belief
that the Court would henceforth disregard labels and measure a tax by its
dollars-and-cents effect on interstate commerce. Interstate commerce would
have to pay its share toward supporting the local governments that gave it
protection, but it need not bear cumulative tax burdens that would place it at
a competitive disadvantage with intrastate commerce. Where a concern oper-
ated almost exclusively within one state, as in Westcrn Live Stock v. Burau
of Revenue, an unapportioned gross receipts tax would be allowable. But
where a substantial portion of the business was conducted outside the taxing
state, as in the Adams and Gwin cases, the tax must be apportioned to be
valid.
This doctrine, developed in cases where the taxing state was that of the
seller, did not operate as smoothly when applied to taxes imposed by the
buyer's state. A sales tax on an interstate sale is in effect a gross receipts tax
on interstate commerce. But while the state of the seller can administer an
apportioned tax without great difficulty,'0 it is virtually impossible to appor-
tion a sales tax. In many cases the seller may maintain no place of business
within the taxing state, delivery being made direct to the buyer from out-of-
state.e° Thus to require a buyer state to apportion a sales tax amounts to a
prohibition of the tax and an apparent competitive advantage in the market
place to interstate commerce. On the other hand, to allow a sales tax on the
16. 305 U. S. 434 (1939), 27 CAr'. I. REv. 336, 39 Cor. L Rm. 864, 23 Mnm%. L.
REv. 969.
17. 250 U. S. 459 (1919).
18. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 440 (1939); Adams
Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 312-3 (1938).
19. For apportionment formulas used and approved in income taxation, sc Bass, Rat-
cliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 271 (1924); Under,ood Type-
writer Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920). For a formula disapproved, scc Hans
Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931). The latter case has been strictly
limited by Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501 (1942).
20. See McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Co., 309 U. S. 70 (1940) (delivery f.o.b. a
factory outside the taxing state).
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full proceeds of an interstate sale ivould appear to p~rmit multiple taxation, at
least to the extent that other' states touched by the commerce exact appor-
tioned levies.
Although the problem was not discussed in these practical terms, some such
considerations may have led to the subsequent qualification of the cumulative-
tax-burden test.21 Sales and use22 taxes on the full proceeds of interstate
sales have been upheld on reasoning that sought help from the pre-1938
doctrine. There could be no duplication of a sales tax, the argument ran, be-
cause the tax was on the local incident of delivery and transfer.m Thus the
possibility of double taxation was not fatal so long as the tax was pegged to
a local incident which could not be the basis of taxation in another state.2
An interstate transaction. was regarded as a series of taxable events, 2r and
taxes levied on each -event did not amount to a cumulative burden. 20 The
local incident that once saved a tax by making its effect on interstate coin-
merce "indirect," now saved it by preventing, on a verbal (legal) level, multi-
ple taxation.
Introduction of this qualification to the cumulative burden test reopened
the question of the validity of taxes imposed by the seller state. Here, too,
the concept of the local incident has been revived and combined with the
newer doctrine. In. International Harvester v. Evatt,2T decided this term,
the Court upheld a capital stock tax which included in the numerator of the
allocation fraction the sales proceeds from goods manufactured within, but
21, Compare the explanation of Mr. Justice Rutledge, Freeman v. Hewitt, 67 Sup.
Ct. 274, 287 et seq. (1946).
22. A use tax operates on the full proceeds of a sale as does a sales tax. The two are
indistinguishable in effect, but the former. is said to be on the use of the goods within the
taxing state after the sale is complete. The "use" label may save a tax against the objection
that the state is not sufficiently connected with a sale to tax it. Compare McLeod v. Dil-
worth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944), uith General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322
U. S. 335 '(1944) ; Comment, 32 Cmtw:. L. REv. 281 (1944) ; Note, 57 HAIM. L. REV. 1086
(1944).
23. Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U. S. 62, 68 (1941);
McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Co., 309 U. S. 70, 77 (1940) ; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Coal'Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 57-8 (1940) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S.
167, 174-8 (1939).
1. 24. 'International Harvester Co, v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340 (1944);
Felt & Tarrant Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1939) ; see also, cases cited note 23 supra.
25. See Chief Justice Hughes dissenting, in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal
Mining Co., 309 U. S..33, 59 (1940).
26. It is always necessary to single out a taxable event within the taxing state in
order, to provide jurisdiction to tax at all. The question of jurisdiction to tax, however,
arises ivhen objection, is raised. under the due process clause, and that question is distinct
from' those involved under the commerce clause and under discussion here. For the due
process aspect 6f the problem, see Merrill, Turisdictlion to Tax-Another Word, 44 YALE
L. J. 582 (1935) ; 50 YALEL. J 9001(1941)."
: 27.' 67 Sup. Ct. 444 (1947). The decision was unanimous, Mr. Justice Rutledge con-
curring in a separate opinion.
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sold outside, the taxing state. Holding the apportionment formula to be a fair
one, the Court disposed of the possibility of multiple taxation by asserting
what the statute asserted: that the tax was "on" the privilege of manufactur-
ing or doing business in Ohio-a privilege which no other state could tax.
This denial of the possibility of double taxation, though in fact it seemed
to exist, found its opposite two months later when the Court declared invalid
a gross receipts tax which apparently could not have been duplicated. In
Joseph v. Carter & WTeekes Stc ,edoring Co.- the taxpayer, a stevedoring cor-
poration in New York city, protested the imposition of an unapportioned
gross receipts tax. While in Freeman v. Hc-wit the majority simply ignored
the cumulative burden test, here it was expressly noted that there was little
danger of multiple taxation. Nevertheless, the court held the tax repugnant
to the commerce clause, saying, "Stevedoring . .. is essentially a part of the
[interstate] commerce itself and therefore a tax upon its gross receipts .. .
is invalid."-- It is possible of course that the reasoning here will be restricted
to cases where the taxpayer is an agency of interstate transportation. Even
if so limited, it is an important exception to the cumulative burden test, note-
worthy in particular since the cases relied on to support that test when first
announced dealt primarily with taxes on transportation. °
Accordingly the words of the Court do not give much indication of just
what does make a tax on gross receipts unconstitutional. If the possibility of
double taxation is not determinative, the Court is apparently left with the
pre-1938 doctrine of "direct" or "indirect" effect-a distinction that does
little more than state a conclusion. But, ignoring the opinions, a fairly con-
sistent pattern of decision seems to appear. The Court has almost uniformly
upheld taxes imposed by the state of the buyer,31 and apportioned taxes by
the state of the seller are apparently unexceptionable. An unapportioned tax
by the seller state is invalid if admittedly on gross receipts, while the fate of
taxes on manufacturing, measured by gross receipts, is a matter of doubt
3 2
28. 67 Sup. Ct. 815 (1947). Mir. Justice Reed spoke for the majority. Mr. Justice
Douglas, joined by Justices Rutledge and Murphy, dissented from the holding that the tax
burdened interstate commerce and declared that it did not conflict with the commerce
clause because impossible of duplication. Mr. Justice Black dissented without opinion.
29. Id. at 821.
30. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 3Q3 U. S. 250, 255-6 (1933).
31. The one apparent exception is McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327 (1944); and
there the grounds for invalidating the sales tax were primarily lack of jurisdiction to tax.
32. The reliance on legislative description of the tax in Intcrnafional Harvsekr v.
Evatf may mean that a levy pegged to a local incident will be approved even if unappor-
tioned. But in Frecinan -v. Hcit, Air. Justice Frankfurter distinguished Amcricar Marn,-
facturing Co. v. St. Louis, where such a tax was upheld, so as to seem to imply that the
tax there had really been apportioned. Mir. Justice Rutledge maintained that the latter
case had never been successfully distinguished, that it had been in effect overruled, and
that only the state of the market should be allowed to tax sales to the limit. Freeman v.
Hewit, 67 Sup. Ct. 274, 285, 290 (1946).
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Finally, a tax on the gross receipts of an agency of interstate transportation
will evidently fall even though duplication is impossible.
It is perhaps not surprising that the cumulative burden test should be
abandoned with the departure from the Court of its foremost advocate, the
late Chief Justice Stone. The opinions in Freentan v. Hewit indicate that
Justice Rutledge is the only remaining enthusiastic disciple. Justice Black
has never subscribed to any doctrine limiting a state's right to levy non-dis-
criminating taxes. He has consistently maintained that both the Constitution
and the complexities involved demand Congressional rather thah judicial
action and that piecemeal supervision by the Court encourages legislative
inertia.1a Justices Douglas and Murphy have at times taken the same posi-
tion,4 but seem most frequently to defend taxes on their individual merits
with arguments cast in more familiar legal terms.85 Of the five justices who
.constituted the majority in the Freemtan and Joseph cases, two (Chief Justice
Vinson and Justice Burton) have yet to articulate their position, and two
(Justices Frankfurter and Reed) have in the past advanced views far from
consistent with their most recent opinions.8 0 Thus it would be hazardous to
predict great longevity for the pronouncements of the present term. A
minority of four strongly disapproves, and both the unity and consistency of
the majority are open to doubt.
But whatever the Court does with the individual taxes that come before
it, its decisions affect only the periphery of the problem of interstate commerce
and state taxation. Whether goods moving across state lines carry too heavy
a tax burden depends not on what taxes are imposed, but on the amount of
the tax bill in dollars and cents. A heavy property tax may add more to costs
than an unapportioned gross receipts levy.3 7 Taxwise, the competitive position
33. See dissenting opinions, Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434,
442 (1939) ; Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 316 (1938) ; cf. Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 784 (1945). For suggested Congressional action, see
Rodell, A Primer on Interstate Taxation, 44 YALE L. J. 1166 (1935) ; Schlesinger, Sales
Taxes and Congress, 39 MICH. L. Rzv. 755 (1941).
34. See dissents, Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 435 (1946) (Douglas and
Murphy) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 795 (1945) (Douglas) ; Mc-
Carroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U. S. 176, 183 (1940) (Black, Douglas, and Frank-
furter). These cases did not involve gross receipts taxes, but the views expressed as to
the extent of the Court's power under the commerce clause to supervise state action apply
equally well to gross receipts tax cases.
35. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 815, 822 (1947); Free-
man v. Hewit, 67 Sup. Ct. 274, 292 (1946).
36. See Justice Frankfurter dissenting, McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309
U. S. 176, 183 (1940) (with Black and Douglas). See Justice Reed for the Court, South-
ern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167 (1939).
37. A net income tax is thought to be an indirect burden on commerce since it oper-
ates only when there is a profit and could not of itself produce a deficit. United States
Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 329 (1918). A gross receipts tax, however, is in-
herently no more burdensome than property or franchise taxes, which are legitimate state
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of interstate commerce will vary with the tax structure of both the state of
the source and the state of the market.3 8 Goods moving from state A to state
B may bear both a manufacturing tax and a sales tax, while goods flowing
from B to A pay neither. The difficulties inherent in regulating this complex
structure through intermittent court action lend support to the position of
Mr. Justice Black. Since his brethren evidently think differently, the im-
mediate concern is with the nature of the supervision to be exercised by the
Court. The same practical considerations that argue against judicial control,
argue equally for regulation that is concerned with the practical consequences
of state taxes. It is to be hoped that the future will not confirm Mr. Justice
Rutledge's fears of a return to doctrine that emphasized syntax rather
than economics.
levies. These taxes are all costs, and the burden varies with the amount of the cost, not
its name.
38. With the 48 states and the District of Columbia there are 2352 combinations of
taxes mathematically possible, and this does not take into account taxes on agencies of
transportation. For discussion and collection of literature on the interstate tax jungle, see
Lockhart, State Tax Barriers to Interstate Trade, 53 HAv. L. Rzv. 1253 (1940).
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